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THE POPULATION BASE FOR APPORTIONMENT
OF THE NEW YORK LEGISLATURE
RUTH C. SILVA*
THE United States Supreme Court's opinion in the Tennessee apport-
ment case did not say that legislative districts must be equal in popu-
lation in order to be constitutional. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice
Brennan merely condemned "arbitrary and capricious" districting with-
out defining the term and remanded the cause to the district court to
determine whether Tennessee's legislative districts actually do violate
the fourteenth amendment.' In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Clark
argued that population equality of districts is not required and that
geographic and other factors as well as population may be given consider-
ation in apportionment and districting measures. - If the ultimate result
of this litigation is not a reduction in the population disparity between
legislative districts, however, Baker v. Carr3 will have been a mere
exercise in judicial futility.
Although not all of the post-Baker apportionment cases 4 have been
* Professor of Political Science at The Pennsylvania State University.
1. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. Id. at 253-58.
3. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The Court held only: (1) that the federal courts have jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter of legislative apportionment and districting; (2) that a justi-
ciable cause of action was stated upon which the petitioners would be entitled to appropriate
relief; and (3) that the petitioners have standing to challenge the Tennessee apportionment
and districting statutes. See Bickel, Black, Emerson, Goldberg, O'Brien, Pollak, Schattschnei-
der & Sindler, A Symposium on Baker v. Carr, 72 Yale L.J. 7 (1962); Bonfield, Baker v.
Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 Calif. L.
Rev. 245 (1962); Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in
Constitutional Desuetude, 46 Minn. L. Rev. 513 (1962); Cormack, Baker v. Carr and
Minority Government in the United States, 3 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 282 (1962); Dixon,
Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 329
(1962); Emerson, Malapportionment and Judicial Power: The Supreme Court's Decision
in Baker v. Carr, 22 L. in Trans. 125 (1962); Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doc-
trine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 673 (1962); Silva, Apportionment in New York (Part One: The Legal Aspects of
Reapportionment and Redistricting: Baker v. Carr), 30 Fordham L. Rev. 581 (1962);
Taylor, Legal Action to Enjoin Legislative Malapportionment: The Political Question
Doctrine, 34 So. Cal. L. Rev. 179 (1961).
4. Since March 26, 1962, when the Supreme Court decided Baker, the federal and state
courts have handed down more than fifty judicial opinions and decrees relating to appor-
tionment and districting in half of the states. These have been collected and reproduced by
the National Municipal League, in Court Decisions on Legislative Apportionment (1962-
1963).
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brought under the Federal Civil Rights Acts, the Supreme Court did
base its jurisdiction in Baker on suffrage provisions of these acts., Conse-
quently, the inference is that greater voter equality will be the ultimate
result of this apportionment litigation.' If the Court accepts this inference,
there is then the question of whether apportionment according to popu-
lation will actually equalize the weight of one popular vote cast for the
legislator in any given district with the weight of one popular vote cast
for a legislator in any other district in the state. The general assumption
has been that apportionment and districting according to population will
promote some vague ideal of voter equality and that it is inconsequential
whether total population or citizen population or voting population be
used as the population base for apportionment and districting.7 This
assumption is correct only if the ratio of voters to total and/or citizen
population is constant throughout the state. If the number of actual
voters per hundred inhabitants is not substantially the same in all
parts of the state, however, apportioning legislators on the basis of total
population will magnify the electoral power of the voter who lives in a
district where a large number of nonvoters reside.'
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1988 (1958). See also Civil Rights Act of 1957 § 131, 71 Stat. 637,
28 U.S.C. § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Supp. IV, 1962).
6. See the Supreme Court's talk about "numerical inequality," about "every voter Is
equal to every other voter in his State," about "every voter's vote is entitled to be counted
once," and "the only weighting of votes sanctioned by the Constitution concerns . .. the
allocation of [U.S.] Senators irrespective of population and the use of the electoral college
in the choice of a President." Gray v. Sanders (the Georgia county-unit case), 31 U.S.L.
Week 4285, 4288 (U.S. March 18, 1963). But see also the Court's distinction between Baker
and this case. Id. at 4287; and the underscoring of this distinction in the concurring opinion
of Justices Clark and Stewart. Id. at 4288-89.
7. Not only can this assumption be found in a number of the briefs and opinions filed
in the cases mentioned in note 4 supra, but this assumption is also a major premise In a
number of studies made by various political scientists. E.g., David & Eisenberg, Devaluation
of the Urban & Suburban Vote, (1961-1962) ; Jewell, The Politics of Reapportionment 1-323
passim (1962). In the Delaware apportionment case, the district court took judicial notice
of "the fact that in the State of Delaware, as in the other States of the United States, there
is a direct and reliable relationship between the number of inhabitants in a given area and
the number of electors therein and that the ratio of electors to inhabitants Is relatively
stable." Sincock v. Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169, 175-76 (D. Del. 1963). The Committee of 39,
a civic group that filed an amicus brief in the Sincock case, found, however, that the actual
number of voters per hundred adult inhabitants in 1962 ranged from 26 in the 2d district
of Kent County to 87 in the 14th district of New Castle County. Notes and Statistics on
Overlay Maps, pt. 2, at 1 (mimeographed, Feb. 21, 1963).
8. If two counties-A and B-each have 110 inhabitants and each is given one legislator
but if County A has 100 voters and ten nonvoters while County B has ten votors and 100
nonvoters, then each voter in County B would have ten times as much electoral power In
choosing a legislator as would one voter in County A. See Schmeckebier, Congressional Ap-
portionment 86-106 (1941).
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The so-called apportionment problem has been confused not only by
a failure to distinguish between inhabitants and electors but also by a
failure to distinguish between apportionment and districting. Apportion-
ment is the distribution of legislative seats among previously defined
territorial or other units entitled to representation" while districting es-
tablishes the precise geographic boundaries of a territorial constituency.' 0
At the national level, constitutional practice makes a sharp distinction
between apportionment and districting by vesting the two functions in
different governments. The national government apportions congressmen
among the states, but the state governments divide their respective states
into congressional districts. Similarly, in New York, the legislature has
the sole power to apportion assemblymen, but the local authorities have
exclusive power to divide their respective counties into assembly dis-
tricts.,'
The confusion caused by a failure to distinguish between apportionment
and districting has been further confounded by a failure to distinguish
between the basis of apportionment and the units to which representa-
tion is apportioned. Because representation is usually apportioned to
territorial subdivisions such as states (congressmen) or counties (New
York assemblymen), the literature on apportionment often speaks of
two bases of representation-area and population. But, except for an
abortive attempt in Wisconsin, 12 actual practice in Illinois in 1955,'" and
recent proposals in Michigan and Nebraska, 14 no one has ever seriously
9. Id. at 1-58. Although representation is usually apportioned to a territorial subdivision
such as a county, it may be apportioned to ethnic or economic groups. E.g., seats in the
Cyprian House of Representatives are apportioned to the Greek and Turkish communities.
N. Y. Times, July 6, 1960, p. 10, col. 4 (late city ed.). Similarly, representation in the Portu-
gese Corporative Chamber and in the Spanish Cortes is apportioned to industrial, labor,
cultural, and professional associations. 3 Peaslee, Constitutions of Nations 222, 279-80 (1956).
10. 2 Webster's New International Dictionary 1052 (2d ed. 1957); 2 Encyclopedia Ameri-
cana 94 (1963) ; Griffith, The Rise and Development of the Gerrymander 15-22, 26-29, 120-
121 (1907) ; Harvey, Reapportionment of State Legislatures-Legal Requirements, 17 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 364, 365, 375 (1952); Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal
Courts, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1059, 1060 (1958); Tabor, The Gerrymandering of State
and Federal Legislative Districts, 16 Md. L. Rev. 277, 278 n.6 (1956); Comment, Getting
the Terms Straight, 52 Natl Civic Rev. 124 (1963); Note, Baker v. Carr and Legislative
Apportionments: A Problem of Standards, 72 Yale L.J. 968, 993 n.119 (1963); see generally
Note, Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders: The Desegregation Decisions
Plus a Problem of Proof, id. at 1041. See also Watts v. Carter, 355 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1962).
11. N.Y. Const. art. II, § 5 (1894).
12. State ex rel. Thomson v. Zimmerman, 264 Wis. 644, 60 N.W.2d 416 (1953).
13. Steiner & Gove, The Legislature Redistricts Illinois 24-25 (1956).
14. Ohsted, New Michigan Constitution Ready, 51 Nat'l Civic Rev. 373 (1962). The
Nebraska plan was adopted in principle by the votors at a referendum held Nov. 6, 1962.
1963]
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advocated apportionment on the basis of acres or square miles or any
other such territorial measure. In apportionment, "area" simply refers
to the distribution of legislative seats among territorial subdivisions
with previously defined boundaries.' 5 In districting, "area" refers to
giving consideration not only to population equality but also to topog-
raphy, to the boundaries of civil subdivisions, to the means of travel
and communication, and to community of social, political and economic
interest.16 Virtually all political scientists agree that population is the
only legitimate basis for apportionment in a democratic state17-- i.e., for
determining the number of legislative seats to be allocated to a previously
defined territorial or other unit. In districting, however, it is generally
agreed that consideration should be given not only to population equality
biit also to topography and to the other factors that are generally labelled
"area factors."'
In earlier periods of democracy, equal representation was frequently
apportioned to civil subdivisions without regard to population statistics. 9
Olmsted & Boyd, Electorate Displays Apportionment Split, 51 Nat'l Civic Rev. 623, 624
(1962); Boyd, Delaware Districts Found Illegal, 52 id. 324, 327 (1963).
15. Schmeckebier, op. cit. supra note 8, at 1-58; Harvey, supra note 10; Baker, State
Constitutions: Reapportionment vii-viii (1960); 2 Encyclopedia Americana 94-96 (1963).
The territorial extent of certain sparsely populated legislative districts has sometimes been
offered as a reason or justification, however, for establishing some districts that are less
populous than others. E.g., N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 31 pp. 9-11 (1950).
16. E.g., comments of Dean, Maybee, Root and Cookinham, 3 Revised Record of the
Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New York 1156-57, 1161, 1223-34 (1900);
4 id. at 8.
17. This appeared to be the unanimous opinion of the sixteen apportionment specialists
(lawyers and political scientists) at the Twentieth Century Fund's conference on legislative
apportionment although one participant subsequently filed a written dissent. Twentieth
Century Fund, One Man-One Vote 3-8, 19-20 (June 15, 1962). The two criteria for appor-
tionment both relate to population equality. Schmeckebier, op. cit. supra note 8, at 70,
quoting a report of the National Academy of Sciences; Schmeckebier, The Method of Equal
Proportions, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob. 302 (1952).
18. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. In addition to these, the criteria for
districting also include contiguity and compactness. Reock, A Note: Measuring Compactness
as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment (Districting?), 5 Midwest J. of Political
Science 70 (1961); Silva, Legislative Representation-With Special Reference to New York,
27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 408, 420-26 (1962). While the two criteria for apportionment
are arithmetically precise (see note 17 supra), those for districting are most imprecise.
Note, Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders: The Desegregation Decisions
Plus a Problem of Proof, supra note 10.
19. The British House of Commons, for example, was originally viewed as an assembly
of representatives of organized communities-House of Communes--and two seats were
apportioned to each county and borough regardless of population. This principle of equal
representation for communities did not seriously violate the population principle when the
population was rather evenly distributed throughout the country. The Industrial Revolution,
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Although counties or towns had equal representation in most colonial
legislatures regardless of population, a few colonies recognized population
differences by apportioning additional seats to the more populous areas.2 0
When Governor Thomas Dongan established New York's first assembly
in 1683, for example, he recognized population as well as locality by ap-
portioning more assemblymen to the more populous settlements. New
York County, for example, had four assemblymen while the less populous
counties had only one or two or three. - ' Yet, neither in New York nor
in any other colony did representation bear a uniform relation to the
number of inhabitants or electors. Proportionality between population
and representation was either crude or nonexistent.
With the democratic concept of an equal vote for every citizen came
the corollary of apportionment on the basis of population.? In the first
however, produced great shifts in population. Many populous cities, such as Birmingham and
Manchester, were either completely unrepresented or grossly under-represented while
rotten boroughs, such as Old Sarum with only seven inhabitants, sent two members
to the House of Commons. Porritt, The Unreformed House of Commons, (2d ed. 1909).
Although the British Reform Act of 1832 (2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 45) was not based on
the democratic principle of apportionment according to population, new parliamentary
boroughs were created to provide representation for the new centers of population, the less
populous boroughs were apportioned one seat instead of two, and the least populous
boroughs lost their status as separate constituencies. With the Redistribution Act of
1885 (48 & 49 Vict, c. 23), community representation yielded to the principle of districting
based on population equality although only a rough arithmetic equality %was achieved. Today,
seats in the House of Commons are distributed by dividing the country into 630 single-
member constituencies with special boundaries and with a relatively equal number of voters
in each district. Redistribution of Seats Act, 12, 13, & 14 Geo. 6, c. 66 (1949) ; Butler, The
Redistribution of Seats, 33 Pub. Admin. Rev. 125 (1955); House of Commons pp. 25-40
(1955) (pub. by The Times of London).
20. Luce, Legislative Principles 336-42 (1930).
21. 1 Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 97-98, 442 (1906); 3 id. at
150-51.
22. In outlining the defects of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1777, the now-famous
Essex Result presented a classic statement of this view: "The rights of representation should
be so equally and impartially distributed, that representatives should have the same views
and interests with the people at large. They should think, feel, and act like them, and, in
fine, should be an exact miniature of their constituents. They should be, if we may use the
expression, the whole body-politic, with all its property, rights, and privileges, reduced to
a smaller scale, every part being diminished in just proportion. To pursue the metaphor,
if, in.. . the representation of freemen, any ten are reduced into one, all the other hundreds
should have just the same reduction.... Let these representatives be apportioned among the
respective counties, in proportion to their number of freemen." Luce, op. cit. supra note 20,
at 344.
In a similar vein, Thomas Jefferson's Notes on Virginia (1782) criticized the Virginia
Legislature's unequal apportionment and proposed a model constitution, which provided for
a lower house in which "the number of delegates . .. each county may send shall be in
proportion to the number of its qualified electors." Since one senator was to be allotted for
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session of the Continental Congress (1774), Patrick Henry urged
the apportionment of congressmen among the states according to total
population excluding slaves. Although apportionment based on popula-
tion was not incorporated into the Articles of Confederation largely
because no census statistics were available and because the plan was
repeatedly vetoed by the small states, the system was written into various
state constitutions.2 3 Pennsylvania was the first to adopt a system of ap-
portionment based on population. Since there were no census returns, the
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 assigned six assemblymen to each
county but declared that "representation in proportion to the number
of taxable inhabitants is the only principle which can at all times secure
liberty, and make the voice of a majority of the people the law of the
land." In conformity with this premise, the constitution provided for a
census in 1778, directed the Legislature to redistribute assemblymen
among the counties "in proportion to the number of taxables," and
ordered another census to be taken and another reapportionment to be
made seven years thereafter "and so on septennially forever. ' 2"
I. BROADENING THE POPULATION BASE IN NEW YORK
Like Pennsylvania's first constitution, New York's Constitution of
1777 provided for a septennial census and reapportionment based on
these census returns.25 Although counties were not divided in the forma-
every six delegates, the senate would also reflect the population base. 3 Jefferson, Writings
222-23, 322-23 (Ford ed. 1894). Also based on this philosophy, the Northwest Ordinance
(1787) guaranteed the inhabitants of the new territory that they would always enjoy "a
proportionate representation of the people in the legislature." Baker, op. cit. supra note 15,
at 3-4.
23. Luce, op. cit. supra note 20, at 343-55.
24. 2 Poore, The Federal and State Constitutions 1544 (1877). The Constitution of 1790
provided that, after every septennial census, representatives were to be "apportioned among
the city of Philadelphia and the several counties, according to the number of taxable
inhabitants in each." Id. at 1549.
25. On senatorial apportionment, see Lincoln, op. cit. supra note 21, at 517-22. With
regard to the apportionment of assemblymen, Draft B submitted at the Convention of 1777
provided: "(Census; Reapportionment of Assembly.). And to the end that the [number
of Taxables] Representation may always continue equal, be it ordained that once in every
seven years a just account of all the [Taxables] Electors resident therein be taken In every
County in such manner as some future Legislature shall direct. And if on such Account It
shall appear that the number of [Taxables] Electors has encreased or diminished in any
County one Seventieth part of the whole number of [Taxables] Electors now in the State,
the Representation of that County shall encrease or diminish in the same proportion so that
the Number of Representatives in General Assembly shall bear as nearly as may be the same
proportion to the Inhabitants of this state as it does at this Time." Id. at 507. (Portions
in brackets were crossed out in the original document.)
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tion of senatorial and assembly districts, the number of electors took
precedence over county lines in the apportionment of legislators. The
state was divided into four great senatorial districts, each of which was
composed of two or more counties, and the number of senators appor-
tioned to each district was proportioned to the number of senate electors
residing in that district. " Indeed, New York has never recognized the
county as a political community entitled to separate representation in the
Senate. All four of New York's constitutions have allowed two or more
counties to be combined into a single senatorial district." In fact, the
Constitution of 1777 permitted two or more counties to be combined
into one single-member or multi-member assembly district so that the
number of assemblymen could be "justly proportioned to the number
of [assembly] electors in the said counties."28
The Constitution of 1821 broadened the population basis of represen-
tation from electors to "inhabitants, excluding aliens, paupers, and per-
sons of colour not taxed," gave increased recognition to locality by
guaranteeing at least one assemblyman to each county, and provided for
a decennial rather than a septennial census.29 The Constitution of 1846
further broadened the population base of representation by dropping
"paupers" from the excluded classes so that each senatorial district was
to contain "as nearly as may be, an equal number of inhabitants, exclud-
ing aliens and persons of color not taxed" while assemblymen were to be
apportioned among the counties, "as nearly as may be, according to the
number of their respective inhabitants, excluding aliens, and persons of
color not taxed." The 1846 Convention also gave increased recognition
to locality by substituting thirty-two single-member senatorial districts
for the eight four-member districts that had existed under the Constitu-
tion of 1821.30
The debates in the Convention of 1846 suggest that "inhabitants, ex-
cluding aliens and persons of color not taxed" was a compromise. To
have based representation on total population would have in-
flated the legislative strength of New York and Kings counties,
where a large number of aliens and Negroes resided. To have tied
26. 3 id. at 168-75. See also Silva, supra note 3 (Part Two: Apportionment of the New
York Senate), at 597-99.
27. Id. at 597-603, 628-38.
28. 3 Lincoln, op. cit. supra note 21, at 165-67. The Convention specifically rejected
three motions to guarantee separate representation to certain counties without regard to
the number of electors residing in these counties. 1 id. at 506-07; Silva, Apportionment of
the New York Assembly, 31 Fordhamn L. Rev. 1, 2-4 (1962).
29. N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 6-7 (1821).
30. N.Y. Cost. art. III, §§ 4-5 (1846).
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representation to suffrage, on the other hand, would have minimized
the strength of these two counties in the Legislature. Much of the
discussion on both sides was irrelevant. Although delegates from New
York and Kings were unwilling to enfranchise aliens and Negroes, they
waxed eloquent about the odium of distinctions based on color and the
payment of taxes and about how the principles of popular government
require representation to be based on total population. They pointed out
that both aliens and Negroes were subject to taxation and moaned about
taxation without representation but failed to admit a relation between
representation and suffrage.31
Similarly, there was little merit in the argument of Onondaga's William
Taylor, who professed to believe in a broad popular base for representa-
tion but who also contended that New York City's aliens should be ex-
cluded from the representation base on the ground that they were mere
transients. For, as Charles O'Conor and other delegates from the City
pointed out, transients-whether aliens or citizens-were not counted in
the census. It is also difficult to understand the rationale behind the
exclusion of aliens and most Negroes on the ground that they could not
vote while including women, children, lunatics and felons, who also could
not vote. Nor was there much logic to counting "paupers" on the
ground that they could vote while rejecting "electors" as an improperly
narrow basis for representation.3 2
If there is any logic to the 1846 Convention's definition of the pop-
ulation base, it simply is that paupers, women, children, lunatics and
felons were relatively evenly distributed throughout the State while
aliens and Negroes were not. Alvah Worden of Ontario, Arphaxed
Loomis of Herkimer, and David S. Waterbury of Delaware correctly
pointed out that the inclusion of nonvoters in the representative popula-
tion would magnify the electoral power of those voters who reside in
areas where relatively large numbers of people are disfranchised. Inclu-
sion of all nonvoters in the representative population, Charles P. Kirkland
of Oneida contended, would give 60,000 voters in New York City repre-
sentation equal to that of at least 75,000 voters in the remainder of the
State.33 This argument is valid, of course, if nonvoters are disproportion-
ately concentrated in certain parts of the State.34 When the ratio be-
31. Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1846 of the State
of New York 298-304, 360-61 passim (Croswell & Sutton ed. 1846).
32. Id. at 298-305, 360-61 passim.
33. Id. at 300, 302-03.
34. See note 8 supra. A similar situation now prevails at the national level, where the
southern states gain additional congressmen on the basis of their nonvoting population. In
1962, for example, congressmen were apportioned to New York and Louisiana almost exactly
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tween voters and total population is approximately the same in every
county, however, the inclusion of nonvoters in the apportionment base
is simply a matter of no consequence.
In 1867, when the next Constitutional Convention met, the thirteenth
amendment had been added to the federal constitution, and the fourteenth
was pending in the states. 5 Consequently, it is not surprising that, with
virtually no discussion, the Convention proposed to include all Negroes
in the representative population. The Convention devoted more attention,
however, to the question of whether aliens should also be included. The
arguments offered in support of basing representation on total population
were much the same as those offered in 1846: aliens pay taxes, own
property, have equal rights in the courts, and so forth. Although the
inclusion of aliens appears to have enjoyed more support among upstate
delegates than it had in 1846, the Convention repeatedly rejected motions
to count all aliens or even declarant aliens in the population base for
apportionment.36 Therefore, the Constitution of 1867 provided for the
apportionment of legislative seats on the basis of "inhabitants of the
State, excluding aliens.137 But, since the electorate rejected this consti-
tution, the population base for legislative representation remained "inhabi-
tants, excluding aliens and persons of color not taxed."38
When the 1872 Commission was established, the thirteenth, fourteenth
and fifteenth amendments were all a part of the federal constitution.3"
Therefore, as one might expect, the Commission recommended that "per-
sons of color not taxed" be dropped from the fourth and fifth sections of
article three. When the Commission's proposed assembly article was
adopted in 1874, the population base for apportioning assemblymen
became "inhabitants, excluding aliens."4 But, since the Commission's
proposal for revising the senate article was killed in the Legislature and
according to total population, but one popular vote cast for congressman in Louisiana had
approximately 8!2 times the weight of one cast in New York-largely because the number
of voters per 100 inhabitants was 33.6 in New York but only 3.8 in Louisiana. Computed
from data published in the Statistical Abstract of the United States 10, 366 (1962); 20
Congressional Q. Weely Report 2163-69, 2206 (1962). See also Schmeckebier, op. cit. supra
note 8, at 91-93.
35. Thirteenth declared in force on Dec. 18, 1865; fourteenth proposed by Congress on
June 16, 1866, and declared in force on July 28, 1868.
36. 1 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of 1867 of the State of
New York 657, 661, 844-48, 852, 864, 866, 870, 873-74 (1868); 2 id. at 1180, 1195-96;
5 id. at 3589, 3591, 3525.
37. 5 id. at 3960.
38. N.Y. Const. art. I, §§ 4-5 (1846).
39. The fifteenth amendment was declared in force on March 30, 1870. See note 35 supra.
40. 2 Poore, op. cit. supra note 24, at 1373.
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never submitted to popular vote, the population base for senatorial ap-
portionment remained "inhabitants, excluding aliens and persons of
color not taxed."'" The enumerations of 1875 and 1892, however, failed
to exclude "persons of color not taxed" so that the senatorial apportion-
ments of 1879 and 1892 were based on citizen population. Although the
Court of Appeals agreed that the constitution required the exclusion of
"persons of color not taxed" from the senatorial apportionment base, the
court declined to invalidate the senate act on the ground that injury
to other inhabitants had not been shown. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, the court presumed that the ratio of white citizens to untaxed
colored citizens was the same in all districts so that the inclusion of un-
taxed Negroes was held to be immaterial.42
When the Convention of 1894 adopted "inhabitants, excluding aliens"
as the population base for legislative apportionment, the Convention
merely wrote the amendment of 1874 and the precedents of 1879 and
1892 into the new constitution. Reference to "persons of color not taxed"
was excised from the constitution without debate.4" Unlike the two
previous conventions, the Convention of 1894 reflected virtually no
sentiment for including aliens in the population base for apportionment.
As a matter of fact, John G. Schumaker of Kings was the only delegate
who urged excision of the phrase "excluding aliens." And, Schumaker's
eloquent defense of the alien would again have been a more cogent
argument for enfranchising the alien than for inclusion of the disfran-
chised alien in the apportionment base. 4
41. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1846).
42. People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 921, affirming 65 Hun 236, 20
N.Y. Supp. 293 (Sup. Ct. 1892) and reversing People ex rel. Pond v. Monroe County Board
of Supervisors, 19 N.Y. Supp. 978 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 65 Hun 263, 20 N.Y. Supp. 97 (Sup. Ct.
1892). As a matter of fact, aliens as well as untaxed Negroes were included in the Kings
County enumeration contrary to the constitutional mandate, but the court erroneously pre-
sumed that the distribution of aliens was such that the apportionment would not have been
materially different if they had been excluded so that the court held that the inclusion of
aliens was harmless. In the Matter of Whitney, 75 Hun 581, 27 N.Y. Supp. 657, aff'd 142
N.Y. 531, 37 N.E. 621 (1894).
43. This question was not discussed on the floor of the Convention. Charles B. Morton
of Kings County presented a petition of one William H. Johnson praying that the word
"color" be stricken from the Constitution. This petition was referred to the Committee on
Legislative Organization, which reported art. III, §§ 2-5, where the word is not found once.
1 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New York 23,
36 (1900).
44. 3 id. at 1186-89. See the arguments of Worden, Loomis, Waterbury and Kirkland, note
33 supra and accompanying text.
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II. CITIZEN POPULATION
Because citizen inhabitants is the population base for legislative ap-
portionment in New York and because the federal census does not
distinguish citizens from aliens,4" it was necessary to provide for an
enumeration of citizens. The Constitution of 1894 transferred this re-
sponsibility from the Legislature to the Secretary of State: "An enumera-
tion of the inhabitants of the State shall be taken under the direction of
the Secretary of State, during the months of May and June, in the year
one thousand nine hundred and five, and in the same months of every
tenth year thereafter."4 Since the Secretary of State presumably could
have been compelled by mandamus to perform this duty, the transfer
doubtless precluded the kind of delay that had preceded the enumeration
of 1892." In any event, the state enumeration was made on schedule in
1905, 1915, and 1925. Yet, these three enumerations were subject to the
same old criticisms-that the cost was relatively high since the State,
unlike the United States Bureau of the Census, did not have a permanent
staff for this purpose, that the state enumerators were often poorly
trained and, consequently, that the state enumerations contained countless
errors. Whatever the merit of these criticisms, a constitutional amendment
was adopted in 1931 to permit the use of federal census returns for
legislative apportionment if and when such returns provided the neces-
sary information.
Since the apportionment base remained citizen population, the 1931
amendment had to be tailored to the constitutional necessity for securing
data on citizen inhabitants. Therefore, the amendment empowers the
Legislature to authorize state officials to make an enumeration of the
entire population whenever the federal census fails to show "the number
of aliens or Indians not taxed" or whenever the federal census is not
taken on schedule so that the returns are unavailable at the beginning
of the Legislature's regular session in the second year of each decade.
The amendment also empowers the Legislature to authorize state officials
to make a partial enumeration when the federal census fails to show
45. Although congressmen are apportioned according to total population, the United
States Bureau of the Census estimates citizen and alien population on a sampling basis-
usually a 20% sample. These estimates are not precise enough, however, to meet New York's
constitutional requirements unless the Court of Appeals is prepared to extend the Whitney
doctrine (note 42 supra).
46. 5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New
York 742 (1900). This provision contains forty-four words. See note 48 infra.
47. Although the Constitution of 1846 provided for an enumeration during the fifth year
of each decade so that one should have been made in 1885, none was made until 1892. See
Silva, Apportionment of the New York Assembly, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 8-10 (1962).
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the citizen population in the State's various civil or territorial subdivi-
sions. With these exceptions, the decennial federal census is controlling
for apportionment purposes.48 In practice, the State of New York has
made various arrangements with the federal government for securing
the necessary statistics on citizen population.
After the 1931 amendment was adopted, the Legislature failed to
appropriate the $20,000 required to tabulate citizen and alien populations
separately. Consequently, in 1933, Governor Herbert H. Lehman arranged
with the Federal Bureau of the Census and the Civil Works Administra-
tion to have C. W. A. workers collect the data without cost to the State.40
If the complaints of various legislators had any merit, the State received
precisely what it paid for. In any event, the 1935 apportionment bill
was defeated because, among other reasons, the C. W. A.'s citizen census
tabulations were allegedly riddled with errors.50
In 1939, the State asked the Bureau of the Census to obtain figures
showing both citizen and alien population when the Bureau made the
48. The framers of this amendment seem to have operated on the apparently traditional
assumption that the quality of a constitutional provision may be measured not only by Its
verbosity but also by the number of its prepositional phrases. The result was that a forty-
four word provision was replaced by a repetitious and loosely constructed amendment of
322 words: "Except as herein otherwise provided, the federal census taken In the year
nineteen hundred thirty and each federal census taken decennially thereafter shall be con-
trolling as to the number of inhabitants in the state or in any part thereof for the purposes
of the apportionment of members of assembly and readjustment or alteration of senate and
assembly districts next occurring, in so far as such census and tabulation thereof purport
to give the information necessary therefor. The legislature, by law, shall provide for the
making and tabulation by state authorities of an enumeration of the inhabitants of the
entire state to be used for such purposes, instead of a federal census, if the taking of a
federal census in any tenth year from the year nineteen hundred thirty be omitted or If the
federal census fails to show the number of aliens or Indians not taxed. If a federal census,
though giving the requisite information as to the state at large, fails to give the information
as to any civil or territorial divisions which is required to be known for such purposes, the
legislature, by law, shall provide for such an enumeration of the inhabitants of such parts
of the state as may be necessary, which shall supersede in part the federal census and be
used in connection therewith for such purposes. The legislature, by law, may provide in Its
discretion for an enumeration by state authorities of the inhabitants of the state, to be used
for such purposes, in place of the federal census, when the return of a decennial federal
census is delayed so that it is not available at the beginning of the regular session of the
legislature in the second year after the year nineteen hundred thirty or after any tenth year
therefrom, or ff an apportionment of members of assembly and readjustment or alteration of
senate districts is not made at or before such a session . . . ." N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4
(1894 as amended Nov. 3, 1931).
49. Csontos, History of Legislative Apportionment in New York 100 (1941) (ms.
in N.Y. State Library).
50. 7 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, Problems Relating to
Legislative Organization and Powers 151-52, 211-14 (1938).
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census of 1940 in New York. The Bureau did this for counties, cities
and towns but had no funds to tabulate the necessary information after
the data were collected.5 Therefore, the State paid the Bureau $20,000
for tabulating expenses. 52 Additional payments were made to secure the
block statistics which were necessary to comply with the constitutional
requirement that a more populous district's population shall not exceed
the population of any less populous adjacent district in the same county
by more than the population contained in the more populous district's
least populous city block or town adjoining the two districts.' The
Bureau supplied the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment
with estimates on the cost of securing these block statistics:
Ten "class A" cities with 8,718,943 inhabitants ........ .$38,650.
Twenty-six "class B" cities with 1,127,720 inhabitants .. 10,700.
Seven "class C" cities with 206,679 inhabitants ...... 3,150.
Total .......... $52,500.
The Joint Legislative Committee paid the Bureau $38,650 for the block
tabulations in "class A" cities, agreed to pay an additional $10,700 for
the tabulations in "class B" cities, and arranged to order the tabulations
for "class C" cities only if the Committee found that it would be necessary
to have these tabulations. 4 Thus, the citizen census of 1940 would have
cost the State only $20,000 if census tracts could have been substituted
for towns and blocks.
The next two enumerations of citizens, however, were far more ex-
pensive operations. The citizen census of 1950 cost the State $288,000'
51. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 25, p. 7 (1942).
52. Csontos, op. cit supra note 49, at 129.
53. N.Y. Const. art. III, §§ 4-5 (1894, as amended Nov. 6, 1945). See generally Silva,
supra note 18, at 420-21 & nn.48-50, 424-26.
54. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 25, pp. 8, 11 (1942).
55. The Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment contracted to pay the Bureau
of the Census $200,000 for the data showing the number of citizens in each county, city
and town. The Committee also contracted to receive block tabulations for certain cities
and towns at an additional cost of $85,000. On Oct. 28, 1950, the Bureau advised the Com-
mittee that an additional $3,300 would be required and, on March 2, 1951, that still $10,000
more might be necessary. The State paid the Bureau on the basis of these estimates with
the understanding that the Bureau would refund any overpayment if its estimates proved
to be too high and that the State would pay the balance if the actual cost exceeded the
Bureau's estimates. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 64, pp. 8-9 (1951); N.Y. Leg., Doc. No. 98, p. 5
(1953). Since the work was performed without employing overtime workers, the Bureau
refunded $10,000. Letter From C. Burr Reed, former Executive Clerk to the Joint Legisla-
tive Committee on Reapportionment, to Ruth C. Silva, Jan. 7, 1960. But see Letter From
Robert D. Stone, Executive Deputy to the Secretary of State, to Ruth C. Silva, Oct. 1, 1959
(sets the figure at $285,000).
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while the citizen census of 1960 cost the State $395,000.11 Although the
State has paid the federal government almost a million dollars to tabulate
citizen population, the Bureau's efforts to distinguish between citizens
and aliens appear to have been no less subject to adverse criticism than
the State's enumerations were.57 William J. O'Shea, Counsel to the
Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment, reported that the
Committee discovered "hundreds of errors" in the citizen-census tabu-
lations made by the Bureau and the Civil Works Administration in
1934.58 Jasper W. Cornaire, the Assistant Counsel, claimed, for example,
that the tabulations of citizen inhabitants included seventeen thousand
crewmen on vessels anchored in New York harbor. The enumerators
appear to have boarded the ships and listed the crews as residents of
New York City. Cornaire said that this error appears never to have
been reported to the Bureau and, consequently, was never corrected by
the Bureau. 59 O'Shea claimed, however, that the Bureau corrected all
of the errors which the Committee had discovered in the course of its
work, and he exhibited a certificate from the Director of the Census and
the United States Secretary of Commerce attesting to the accuracy of the
corrected tabulations.00
Cornaire argued that the certificate was meaningless, because the
Director of the Census did not know and could not know whether the
tabulations were correct or not since they had been made by C. W. A.
workers, over whom the Census Bureau had no supervisory authority.
Since this was true and since these workers were not under oath as
required by federal law, Cornaire argued that the C. W. A.'s citizen-census
tabulations were no more a part of the federal census than were the
tabulations made by newspapers. He argued further that the Bureau
56. Letter From Richard M. Scammon, Director of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, to
Ruth C. Silva, Dec. 20, 1962.
57. E.g., John E. Burrill's and Solomon Townsend's complaints about the errors In the
state enumeration of 1865. 1 Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of
1867 of the State of New York 844-45, 874 (1868) ; 5 id. at 3682. See also Charles Z. Lin-
coln's and Charles B. Morton's allegations that the state enumeration of 1892 was "a fraud,"
counted aliens as citizens downstate, and, consequently, inflated New York City's appor-
tionment base. 3 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of
New York 1062-63, 1112-13 (1900). On the other hand, John M. Bowers contended that the
federal census of 1890 failed to include many of the City's inhabitants--both citizen and
alien. He said, for example, that it showed only 929 inhabitants in a ward where more than
1,400 actually lived. 3 id. at 1139.
58. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, p. 9 (1935).
59. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 89, p. 7 (1935).
60. 7 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, op. cit. supra note 50, at
152, 199-200.
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lacked legal authority to issue a certificate of the sort exhibited by
O'Shea.6
Even if these tabulations were accurate, both O'Shea and Cornaire
agreed that they were in an almost unusable form. Blocks were described
in the Census Bureau's terminology-e.g., Block 490-K in Tract 74 in
Area M9 A, and so forth. In an effort to make these tabulations intel-
ligible, the Committee transposed the data onto large master maps.
Although this process was tedious and time consuming, O'Shea seems to
have thought that the results were satisfactory. 2 But Cornaire said that
the data for drawing assembly districts were not available for many
cities. The tabulations for Syracuse, Binghamton, Utica, Albany, Troy
and Yonkers, for example, were not prepared in block form. Therefore,
various county boards could not have divided their respective counties
into assembly districts. In short, Cornaire claimed that the whole opera-
tion was riddled with inaccuracy, inadequacy and unconstitutionality
from beginning to end.63
The 1934-1935 episode may not be a fair test of the success with
which federal census tabulations of citizen population may be used for
apportionment purposes. Since the constitutional amendment authorizing
their use was not ratified until more than a year after the census of 1930
had been made and since the Bureau of the Census does not ordinarily
separate citizens from aliens, the tabulations made in 1934 were a retro-
spective operation. Prior to 1940, however, the Bureau was informed
that New York wished to purchase separate tabulations of citizen inhabit-
ants. The Bureau's cooperation seems to have been excellent, but the
whole operation was fraught with problems and delays. The county
figures, which were due on December 1, 1941, were not available until
December 26th. Certain block data due on February 1, 1942, were not
supplied until many weeks later while other block data were not delivered
until still later.64 Separating citizens from aliens seems to have been a
more formidable task than the Bureau had anticipated so that delays
forced the Legislature twice to extend the life of the Joint Legislative
Committee on Reapportionment. 5 Three years later, the Committee
61. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 89, pp. 7-8 (1935).
62. 7 New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, op. cit. supra note 50, at
151-52; New York State Legislature, Executive Session of the Joint Legislative Committee
on Reapportionment, March 1935, at 7-8 (ms. in N.Y. State Library).
63. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 89, pp. 8-9 (1935).
64. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 25, pp. 7-9 (1942). Similarly, the block tabulations of the 1960
citizen population were not available so that the 1962 legislative session %as unable to estab-
lish senatorial districts based on the 1960 data.
65. N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 53, p. 5 (1945).
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reported that use of the federal census data had been less than satisfac-
tory and that the Committee's work had been hampered not only by
delays in receiving the data but also by "the discovery of many errors
and discrepancies which the Census Bureau found it difficult to correct
and reconcile." Consequently, the Committee recommended adoption
of a constitutional amendment with a more elastic provision for use
of a state enumeration when federal census data are unsatisfactory."0
In considering the Committee's recommendation, one should remember
that past state enumerations were more expensive but no more satis-
factory." Since New York is one of only five states that exclude some
or all aliens from the apportionment base, 68 perhaps the problem could
be solved more satisfactorily by adoption of a constitutional amendment
that excised the phrase "excluding aliens" and permitted the use of
census tracts instead of city blocks. Then, the population base for appor-
tionment would be total population as reported by the Bureau of the
Census. This proposal raises the question of whether apportionments
based on total population would really differ from those based on citizen
population. If the ratio between aliens and citizens varies greatly from
county to county, apportionments based on total population would
magnify the electoral power of voters in counties having a large number
66. Id. at 11.
67. See note 57 supra.
68. California excludes only aliens who are ineligible for naturalization while Maine,
Nebraska, New York and North Carolina exclude all aliens. Maine also excludes untaxed In-
dians from the senatorial apportionment base while Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington
and Wisconsin exclude untaxed Indians from the apportionment base for both houses.
Although the Book of the States 58-62 (1962-1963) shows that New York excludes only
aliens, the 1931 amendment would seem to also exclude untaxed Indians (note 48 supra).
Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library, Reapportionment of the State Legislature In
Wisconsin (Information Bull. No. 130, March, 1954) 4; Baker, State Constitutions: Re-
apportionment 6 (1960). Administrative and judicial decisions in Minnesota have held that
the phrase "Indians not taxed" is dormant since all Indians are now subject to some form of
taxation. Minnesota Legislative Research Committee, Legislative Reapportionment (Publica-
tion No. 63, Oct., 1954) 14n. Washington and Wisconsin exclude military personnel on active
service while Alaska limits the apportionment base to civilian population. Alaska Legislative
Council, Legislative Districting and Apportionment in Alaska (Staff Mem. No. 8, 1956) 4-7,
15; Baker, op. cit. supra at 6.
Of the forty-seven states having a popular base for apportioning the seats in one or both
houses, thirty-three use total population as that base. For both houses in: Alabama, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia and Wyoming; for the lower house in: Ar-
kansas, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas and West Virginia;
for the Senate in: Iowa and Vermont. The Book of the States 58-62 (1962-1963).
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of aliens.69 If the alien percentage of the total population is approximately
the same in every county, however, the inclusion of aliens in the appor-
tionment base is inconsequential.
It was certainly reasonable to exclude disfranchised aliens from the
apportionment base in 1894, when 21 per cent of New York County's
inhabitants were aliens while only 52 per cent of the upstate's popula-
tion could be so classified. As recently as 1930, less than 84 per cent of
New York City's population were citizens while 932 per cent in the
remainder of the State fell in this category. In the thirty years since
1930, however, the results of the federal government's stricter immigra-
tion laws have been reflected in the composition of New York State's
population. Old aliens have been dying, and their sons and daughters
are United States citizens. Relatively few new aliens have been entering
the country. The new immigrant is a Puerto Rican, a United States
citizen and, therefore, a part of the apportionment base. The number of
aliens has declined more rapidly in the City than in the remainder of the
State so that, by 1960, no county's population included more than 6.7
per cent aliens. 7
0
If total rather than citizen population had been the apportionment
base in 1894, New York City would have gained an additional senator
and six assemblymen. Inclusion of aliens in the apportionment base in
1906 and 1907 would have given the City two additional senators and
would have transferred three assemblymen from the remainder of the
State to the City. Under the enumeration of 1915, the City would have
gained three senators and five assemblymen if total population had been
the apportionment base.7' During the two decades from 1930 to 1950, how-
ever, the disproportionate concentration of aliens in the City declined so
greatly that the inclusion of aliens in the apportionment base in 1953 would
not have transferred a single senator or assemblyman from one county
to another.7 2 Thus, the expenditure of $288,000 for securing the citizen
69. See notes 8 and 34 supra.
70. See Appendix A infra.
71. Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 171-214
(1895); N.Y. Leg. Manual 860-61 (1935); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 85, p. 57 (1935); N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 59, pp. 32-33 (1942). For a county-by-county breakdown of the gain or loss of
legislative seats if total rather than citizen population had been the apportionment base
from 1892 to 1950, see 2 Silva, Legislative Apportionment (State of New York Temporary
Commission on Revision and Simplification of the Constitution, Staff Rep. No. 33), at
IV-21, IV-44 to IV-46 (1960). For an explanation of the apportionment formulae which are
provided by the New York Constitution as interpreted by the Legislature and the court
and which, therefore, were used to make these computations, see Silva, Apportionment in
New York (Part Two: Apportionment of the New York Senate), 30 Fordham L. Rev.
581, 603-38 (1962) ; Silva, supra note 28, at 13-47.
72. The distribution of senators and assemblymen would have been precisely the same
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population data for 1950 served no purpose other than fulfilling a techni-
cal requirement of the state constitution.
At the next apportionment, however, use of total rather than citizen
population would mean one more senator for New York County at the
expense of the less populous upstate counties. Similarly, it would mean
one more assemblyman for Bronx and one less for Onondaga County."'
This is true not because New York and Bronx counties still have large
numbers of aliens but because the present apportionment formulae are
if total population rather than citizen population had been used as the apportionment base
in 1953. Silva, Apportionment of the New York State Legislature, 55 Am. Pol. Sc. Rev. 870,
881 (table XV) (1961).
73. The comparison of apportionments based on 1960 citizen population and on 1960
total population in the fourteen most populous counties follows:
Number of Assemblymen a  Number of Senate Ratlosb
Citizen Total Citizen Total
County population population population population
Bronx 10 11 4+ 4+
Erie 8 8 3+ 3+
Kings 19 19 7+ 7+
Nassau 10 10 3+ 3+
New York 12 12 4+ 5+
Queens 13 13 5+ 5+
Number of Second Ratioso
Citizen Total
population population
Albany 2 2 1.24 1.19
Monroe 5 5 2.63 2.57
Niagara 2 2 1.09 1.06
Oneida 2 2 1.20 1.16
Onondaga 4 3 1.91 1.85
Richmond 2 2 1.00- 0.97+
Suffolk 5 5 3.00- 2.92
Westchester 6 6 3.61 3.54
a Assemblymen apportioned according to the Brown formula. Leg. Doec. No. 98, pp. 11-12
(1953); Matter of Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 59, 113 N.E. 545, 549 (1916).
b The constitution provides that a senate ratio shall be found by dividing the State's
total citizen population by fifty. Each county having more than three ratios of citizen pop-
ulation (i.e., 6% of the State's total citizen population) is allotted one senator for each full
ratio. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4 (1894).
C Counties having less than three ratios are apportioned senators on the basis of a second
and smaller ratio. Matter of Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943) ; Matter of Sherrill, 188
N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907); Silva, supra note 71, at 628-32. Apportionments made from
data on 1960 census of citizen and total populations supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
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such that only a few less inhabitants in one of the most populous counties
may deprive that county of a senator or assemblyman."
III. VOTING POPULATION
Although citizens now bear a substantially uniform relation to total
population in every county,75 it does not follow that voters bear a sub-
stantially uniform relation to either total or citizen population. In the
assembly elections of 1960, for example, the number of voters per
hundred inhabitants ranged from 30.5 in Tompkins County to 60.8 in
Putnam7 6 so that, if assemblymen had been apportioned precisely ac-
cording to population, one voter in Tompkins would have had approxi-
mately twice as much electoral power as one in Putnam.", Therefore, if
the aim be voter equality, then the apportionment base would have to
be voters rather than either citizens or total population."
If voters rather than population is to be the apportionment base, a
74. The constitution provides that "no county shall have four or more senators unless
it shall have a full ratio for each senator." N.Y. ConsL art. III, § 4 (1894) ; see note 73-b
supra. Under the census of 1960, New York County has 5.06 ratios of total population but
only 4.88 ratios of citizen population. The "full ratio" rule does not apply, however, to the
less-than-four-senator counties. Under the 1960 census, the ratio is 324,816 citizens, but the
average citizen population per senator in the six most populous counties will be 366,128
while it will be only 216,822 in the less populous counties. Similarly, according to the 1960
census of total population, the ratio would be 335,646 inhabitants but the average population
per senator in the six most populous counties would be 367,587 while it would be only
228,582 in the remaining counties. See note 73-c supra.
Under the citizen census of 1960, the Brown formula will give the last (150th) assembly-
man to Onondaga County on the basis of a remainder of 60,911 rather than to Bronx with
a remainder of 53,143. If total population were used, however, the Brown formula would
give this last assemblyman to Bronx on a remainder of 58,763 rather than to Onondaga
with a remainder of 56,478. Ten seats for Bronx and four for Onondaga wvill mean that the
average citizen population per assemblyman will be 136,821 in Bronx and 103,693 in Onon-
daga-a difference of 33,128 citizen inhabitants. Eleven seats for Bronx and three for Onon-
daga would mean that the average citizen population per assemblyman would be 124,382
in Bronx and 138,257 in Onondaga-a difference of only 13,875 citizen inhabitants. See note
73-a supra; Silva, supra note 28, at 58, 62. For an analysis of the operation of the Brown
formula, see id. at 24-28, 34-35.
75. See Appendix A infra.
76. See Appendix B infra.
77. See notes 8 and 34 supra.
78. While voter equality requires that nonvoters be excluded from the apportionment
base if they do not bear a substantially uniform relation to voters in every area of the
state, note 8 supra, there seems to be little reason for Indiana's apportionment base of male
inhabitants over twenty-one since this includes some nonvoters but excludes approximately
half of the State's actual electorate. The Book of the States 60 (1962-1963). If male inhab-
itants over twenty-one bear a constant ratio to actual voters in all parts of Indiana, how-
ever, this apportionment base wil promote voter equality.
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decision must be made concerning whether this base is to be those legally
entitled to vote or those registered to vote or those who actually do
vote.79 The Constitution of 1777 resolved this question-rightly or
wrongly-by making "qualified electors" the apportionment base. The
modern equivalent would be "registered voters." This, however, is
premised on the mistaken assumption that actual voters bear a constant
ratio to registration in every county. The fact is, however, that registra-
tion procedures are not uniform throughout the State so that the ratio
of actual voters to registered voters varies substantially from county
to county. In the assembly elections of 1960, for example, the number
of actual voters per hundred registrants ranged from 51.8 in Sullivan
County to 95.6 in Delaware County"° so that, if assemblymen had been
apportioned exactly according to registration, one voter in Sullivan
would have had almost twice as much electoral power as one in Dela-
ware."' Thus, apportioning and districting on the basis of registration
would generally favor the villages and rural areas that have nonpersonal
registration, because the registration lists in these areas tend to contain
a relatively larger proportion of nonvoters than do the lists in towns and
cities where personal registration is required. 2 Therefore, if the aim is
voter equality, registration should be rejected as the population base for
legislative apportionment.
The obvious alternative to registration is the actual number of votes
cast. The question then becomes which votes: those cast in a presidential
year, or in a gubernatorial year? or those cast for legislative or for
gubernatorial candidates? The 1938 Convention proposed to apportion
legislators according to the number of electors casting ballots at the
most recent gubernatorial election.8 The objection to this proposal is
79. The population base for legislative apportionment is "legal voters" for both houses
in Massachusetts; "qualified voters" for the Rhode Island Senate and for both houses in
Tennessee; "qualified electors" for the Senate but population for the lower house in Texas.
Id. at 59-61. Hawaii apportions members of the lower house "on the basis of the number
of voters registered at the last preceding election." H.R. Rep. No. 32, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-
33 (1959) ; S. Rep. No. 80, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 42-43 (1959) ; Lau, Reapportionment of the
Territorial Legislature (Univ. of Hawaii Leg. Reference Bureau, Rep. No. 2) 15-25 (1958)
and a supplement prepared by Takaaki Izumi, 1-9 (Dec. 5, 1958); Pub. L. No. 3, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (March 18, 1959).
80. See Appendix C infra.
81. See notes 8 and 34 supra.
82. See Appendix C infra.
83. New York State Constitutional Convention of 1938, Doc. No. 16, p. 49 (1938).
The Queens County Bar Association and others have also proposed a constitutional
amendment to substitute the gubernatorial vote cast at every third election for citizen
population. New York Times, Jan. 21, 1943, p. 11, cols. 5-6. The population base for ap-
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that gubernatorial elections occur in nonpresidential years, and voter
participation in presidential years does not increase at a uniform rate
throughout the State. New York City, for example, contributes a higher
percentage to the state-wide vote in a presidential than in a gubernatorial
year.84 Therefore, apportioning legislators precisely according to the
vote cast in a gubernatorial year would tend to under-represent New
York City in relation to the rest of the State while apportionments based
on the vote cast in a presidential year would tend to under-represent the
remainder of the State in relation to New York City. In other words,
the former apportionment base would devaluate a popular vote cast
in New York City while the later proportionment base would devaluate a
vote cast outside the City. Consequently, if the aim is voter equality, the
apportionment base should be the number of votes cast for either senator
or assemblyman at the last two regular elections.8" This would mean
that legislators would be apportioned on the basis of votes cast both
in a presidential and a gubernatorial year.
That voter equality would be promoted by apportionments based on
actual voters rather than on citizen or total population is a conclusion
which is premised on the assumption that the apportionment rules will
not discriminate against areas where a proportionately large number
of nonvoters reside. With New York's present apportionment rules,
however, a population base produces greater parity in representation and,
consequently, more voter equality than a voter base would. For, use of
either total or citizen population inflates the apportionment base for
New York City86-- an area that is adversely affected by the present
apportionment rules87 but an area that has a relatively large proportion
portionment of Arizona's lower house is the number of votes cast for governor at the last
preceding general election. The Book of the States 59 (1962-1963).
84. See Appendix D-1 to D-3 infra.
85. Ibid.
86. See Appendices B and D-1 to D-3 infra.
87. For an analysis of how the rules for senatorial apportionment discriminate against
the six most populous counties, see Silva, supra note 71, at 603-38. For an analysis of how
the rules for assembly apportionment discriminate against the fourteen most populous coun-
ties, see Silva, Apportionment of the New York Assembly, 31 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 13-28,
33-35, 44-47 (1962). New York City now has 45.77 of the State's total citizen population,
approximately 42% of the State's actual electorate (Appendix ]D-1 infra), 43.1% of the
total number of senators, and 43.3% of the assemblymen (Appendix D-2 infra). The City
now enjoys this parity of representation, however, because the City's population has been
declining both relatively and absolutely since the last reapportionment, which %as based
on the citizen census of 1950. This fact is clearly indicated in the following table, which
assumes that a new reapportionment based on the 1960 citizen census had been operative
at the times of the last three general elections.
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of nonvoters.8 8 Thus, use of population as the apportionment base
partially mitigates the discriminatory nature of the present rules. If
more equitable rules were adopted, however, the arguments for using a
voter base rather than a citizen or a total population base would be
rather compelling.89
The arguments in favor of making votes rather than either total or
citizen population the popular base for apportionment are largely three.
First, it is contended that apportionment according to population simply
magnifies the electoral power of voters who live in areas having a rela-
tively large number of nonvoters. ° Democratic principles require, the
Relative weight
Number of Number of popular votes per senatorO of one
senators under popular vote
Area census of 1960a 1958 1960 1962 Average forscnatord
Nassau 3 152,217 189,118 155,010 165,448 1.000
Erie 3 121,301 155,241 119,214 131,919 1.254
Queens 5 114,074 154,935 122,416 130,475 1.268
New York 4 115,796 150,504 112,647 126,316 1.310
Bronx 4 108,088 135,539 105,123 116,250 1.423
Kings 7 101,318 135,375 101,943 112,879 1.466
48th Districtb 1 62,961 77,492 60,268 66,907 2.473
All other
counties 30 81,067 99,419 80,237 86,908 1.904
Entire State 57 96,327 122,099 96,260 104,895 1.577
a See note 73 supra.
b Cayuga, Tioga, and Tompkins counties.
0 The total number of popular votes cast for senatorial candidates in that area divided
by that area's number of senators under the apportionment based on the citizen census of
1960. Computed from data in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 1093-1103 (1959);
N.Y. Leg. Manual 1168-79 (1962-1963); and data on the 1962 senatorial elections supplied
by the N.Y. Secretary of State.
d The average number of popular votes per senator in Nassau County (165,448) divided
by the average number of popular votes per senator in any other given area. The quotient
means, for example, that one popular vote cast for senator in the 48th District has 2.473
times the weight of one cast in Nassau County. To put it another way, ten voters In the
48th District had the weight of almost twenty-five in Nassau. For a similar table showing
the even greater voter inequality that results from the present rules for assembly apportion-
ment, see Appendix E infra.
88. See Appendices B and D-1 to D-3 infra.
89. For examples of such proposed formulae, see Silva, supra note 87, at 47-57; Silva,
supra note 71, at 638-50. For apportionments (1930-1958) resulting from the application
of several of these proposed formulae to total population, citizen population, gubernatorial
vote, registration, and vote for assemblyman, see 2 Silva, op. cit. supra note 71, at IV-47
to IV-62.
90. See note 8 supra.
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argument continues, that each voter's ballot shall have equal weight.
Advocates of this position point out that, just as apportioning United
States Congressmen on the basis of population results in giving a
southerner's vote several times the weight of a northerner's vote,"1 so
also would apportioning state legislators exactly according to popula-
tion result in giving more weight to a Bronx voter's ballot than to a
Monroe voter's ballot.92
Advocates of a population rather than a voter base may answer that
this analogy is fallacious because the southern states themselves limit
suffrage while New York's counties do not have this power. There is
a difference, this answer might continue, between a state's limiting suffrage
within its own borders and a person's choosing not to vote. If a southern
state limits suffrage, it has no morally valid ground for objecting to
a reduction of its congressional representation, 93 but a county in New
York may have some ground for objecting to a reduction of its legislative
representation since voter participation depends at least partially on
the ease with which a potential voter can qualify and since registration
procedures are not uniform throughout the State. Basing representation
on votes, the argument continues, would favor the less populous areas
which state law permits to have nonpersonal registration. 4 Therefore, it
may be argued, a uniform registration procedure would be a necessity if
legislators were to be apportioned on the basis of votes.
The second argument in favor of basing representation on votes rather
than on population is that such an apportionment base would stimulate
voter participation since the citizen would know that the magnitude of
his county's representation would depend on his casting a ballot.9 Advo-
cates of the population base might well answer that electoral participa-
tion depends on a great many factors other than suffrage laws, registration
procedures and the voter's sense of civic duty. They contend, for example,
that voter participation will always be higher in a "doubtful" district
than in a "safe" one because, in the latter, the majority party's supporter
knows that his vote is superfluous while the minority party's supporter
knows that his vote is futile.9" The answers to this contention are two:
(1) Most of New York State's legislative districts are "safe" for one
party or the other so that basing representation on votes would not
91. See note 34 supra.
92. See Appendix B infra.
93. Schmeckebier, Congressional Apportionment 93-97 (1941).
94. N.Y. Election Law § 157. See also N.Y. Election Law §§ 153-54, 156, 162, 165-66.
See Appendix C infra.
95. Schmeckebier, op. cit. supra note 93, at 97.
96. Id. at 93-94.
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consistently discriminate against particular areas or counties; (2)
Gubernatorial and presidential elections are almost always "doubtful"
in New York so that the "safe district" argument is not a valid reason
for failure to go to the polls and, therefore, it is simply a matter of
whether one who goes to the polls votes for a legislative as well as for
a presidential or a gubernatorial candidateY7 Moreover, if the guber-
natorial vote is the apportionment base, the "safe district" argument
has little validity since the entire state is usually one great "unsafe"
gubernatorial district.
The third argument in favor of basing representation on votes is
that use of this apportionment base would avoid the expense and delay
involved in the use of census data. 8 The obvious answer is that no cost
to the State would be involved and the delay would be greatly reduced
if total rather than citizen population were used and if census tracts
were substituted for city blocks in districting. Thus, the question of
votes versus either total or citizen population resolves itself into this
question: Which apportionment base will better promote voter equality?
If equitable apportionment formulae are used, equalization of each
voter's share in a state senator or in an assemblyman can best be
accomplished by distributing legislators on the basis of votes, cast for
state senator (or assemblyman) at the last two regular elections. If
the aim is not voter equality, however, the whole discussion about the
equity of apportionment formulae and about a population or voter
base is irrelevant. And, if the aim is not voter equality, it is difficult to
understand why the Supreme Court relied in Baker on the suffrage
provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Acts."
IV. DISTRIBUTION AND MOBILITY OF PEOPLE AND VOTERS
While New York's population base for representation had broadened,
its relative importance has declined as the apportionment formulae have
given increased weight to locality. The Constitution of 1777 simply
provided for the apportionment of legislators according to the number of
97. As a matter of fact, the total number of valid votes cast for state senator (or assem-
blyman) usually exceeds 96% of the total valid votes cast for governor (in gubernatorial
years) or 96% of the total valid votes cast for president (in a presidential year). In 1960,
for example, the total valid vote cast for assemblyman (7,030,448) was equal to 96A% of
the total valid vote cast for president (7,290,823). In 1962, the total valid vote for assem-
blyman (5,511,816) fell to a low of 94.9% of the total valid vote cast for governor (5,805,-
342). Computed from data published in various editions of the N.Y. Leg. Manual (1930-
1962) and data on the 1962 elections supplied by the N.Y. Secretary of State. Blank, void
and scattered ballots excluded in all cases.
98. Schmeckebier, op. cit. supra note 93, at 97.
99. See notes 3, 5 & 6 supra.
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electors. But the Constitution of 1821 broadened the popular base and
guaranteed one assemblyman to each county regardless of how few
representative inhabitants that county might have. This guarantee of
separate representation for every county did not seriously limit the
population principle when the State's inhabitants were more evenly
distributed throughout the State and when the total number of counties
was smaller. As the number of counties increased, however, the popula-
tion and electorate grew more rapidly in the New York City area than
in the remainder of the state. Consequently, the number of counties below
the ratio' increased so that the guarantee of separate assembly repre-
sentation for every county became a serious limitation on the principle
of apportionment according to representative population.' 10 The Consti-
tution of 1846 added districting provisions which recognized not only
the county but also the town as a political community entitled to repre-
sentation as a unit--districting provisions which inevitably made popula-
tion disparities between districts greater than in the past.0 - The
Constitution of 1894 modified the population principle still further by
placing arbitrary limitations on the representation of the most populous
counties. 0 3
While these apportionment patterns were developing in New York,
similar patterns were developing in other states so that, today, a majority
of state constitutions limit apportionment according to population. Pro-
fessor Malcolm E. Jewell has classified these various apportionment pat-
terns into six categories: 04
100. I.e., counties that each have less than 1/150 of the State's total citizen population.
Since there are 150 assemblymen, one assembly ratio equals 1/150 of the State's total citizen
population. N.Y. Const. art. III, § 5 (1894). According to the citizen census of 1960, thirty-
eight of the State's sixty-one counties (with Fulton and Hamilton combined as one county)
are below the ratio. Silva, supra note 87, at 18-20.
101. A similar development has taken place in a number of other states. The Kansas
Constitution of 1861, for example, guaranteed one representative to each of the thirty-four
counties while the other forty-one representatives were apportioned to the more populous
counties according to population. Today, however, there are 105 counties while the House
is frozen at 125 members. Since 105 representatives are assigned to the counties without
regard to population, only twenty remain to be apportioned according to population so
that the four most populous counties have 37.77 of the State's population but only 127
of the seats in the lower house. Kansas Directory 123-25 (1961). See also Page, Legislative
Apportionment in Kansa 55, 86 (1952).
102. Silva, Legislative Representation-With Special Reference to New York, 27 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 408, 420-24 (1962).
103. Silva, supra note 87, at 21-28, 44-46; Silva, supra note 71, at 603-13.
104. Jewell, Constitutional Provisions for State Legislative Apportionment, 8 Western
Political Q. 271-79 (1955). Nebraska's unicameral legislature is included in the total for
the first category but is classified as neither a senate nor a lower house. Professor Gordon E.
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Lower
Senate house Total
1. Population o5  19 12 32 (sic)
2. Population but weighted ratios 06 1 7 8
3. Dual basis of population and "area" 10 7  17 28 45
4. Equal representation for each unit1 08  7 1 8
5. Fixed constitutional apportionment o 9  4 1 5
6. Direct taxes paid 1 1o 1 0 1
Total ..... 49 49 99 (sic)
As in New York, a number of state constitutions guarantee separate
representation to each county or town"' and/or place limitations
Baker updated and adjusted Jewell's figures to accommodate: (1) the addition of four cham-
bers-Alaska and Hawaii-in 1959; (2) the shift of the Arkansas Senate from one category
to another in 1956; and (3) two errors in Jewell's original classification-one mistakenly
listing the Georgia and West Virginia Senates in the- population group and the second
mistakenly listing the New Mexico House in the fixed apportionment group. Baker, op. cit.
supra note 68, at 5.
105. Total, citizen, male inhabitants over 21, voters, etc. See notes 78-79 & 83 supra.
106. "Weighted ratios" simply means that a larger ratio is used to apportion to the most
populous counties than the one used to apportion to the less populous counties. Such ratios
are used for apportioning both chambers in New York. Silva, supra note 87, at 21-28; Silva,
supra note 71, at 628-32. While Jewell lists the New York Senate in this second category,
he lists the New York Assembly in the third. Jewell, supra note 104, at 274-75.
107. By "area," Jewell simply means that separate representation is guaranteed to the
least populous units and/or that maximum limitations are placed on the representation of
the most populous units. He does not imply that apportionment is made on the basis of
acres or square miles or any other such area measure. Although the least populous counties
are each guaranteed separate representation in the New York Assembly while limitations are
placed on the senatorial representation of the most populous counties, Jewell lists only the
Assembly in this third category. Id. at 275.
108. Equal representation for each county in Arizona, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico and South Carolina Senates; and equal representation for each city
and town in Vermont's lower chamber. Ibid.
109. The Arkansas, Michigan and Hawaii Senates; both chambers in Delaware. Ibid.
110. New Hampshire Senate. Ibid.
111. This guarantee impairs the population principle only if the total number of coun-
ties is great in relation to the total number of members to be apportioned or if the number
of counties below the ratio is great in relation to the total number of members. Iowa's pres-
ent constitution, for example, guarantees one representative to each of the State's ninety-
nine counties and limits the number of members to 108 so that the nine most populous
counties can each have only two members. Iowa Legislative Research Bureau, A Look at
State Apportionment and Reapportionment (Bulletin No. 4) 5-6 (1956). As a result, the
five most populous counties with 27.3% of the population have only 9.3% of the seats In
the lower house. Iowa Official Register 60-95, 295-96 (1961-1962); Nat'l Munic. League,
Compendium on Legislative Apportionment, at Iowa-1 (2d ed. 1962). In Connecticut, on
the other hand, the guarantee of one senator to each county is relatively insignificant be-
cause there are only eight counties, six of which are above the ratio while the other two
[Vol. 3 2
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on the representation of the most populous counties or towns. 1 2 Also as
in New York, the adoption of such constitutional provisions was
generally motivated by a fear that one or two of the state's growing
metropolitan areas would control the legislature if the legislators were
apportioned on a population base without limitation. While there may
still be some foundation for this expectation in certain states,"' such
fears are based on population trends that no longer prevail in New York
State. New York City no longer contains a majority of the State's
population or a majority of the State's electorate. Furthermore, the
downstate counties are no longer growing more rapidly than those up-
state.
During the period since 1894, the population and the number of
voters in the thirteen metropolitan area counties upstate have grown at
approximately the statewide rate so that these counties now have approxi-
mately one fifth of the State's population and one fifth of the State's
electorate-roughly the same proportion as in 1894. The forty less
urbanized counties upstate, however, have suffered a relative decline of
about fifty per cent. While approximately thirty per cent of New York's
population and one third of its electorate lived in these counties in 1894,
less than one sixth can be found there today. During the first fifty years
of this period, the rural counties' relative loss was absorbed by New
York City so that the City's share of the State's representative popula-
tion jumped from 42Y per cent in 1892 to 53 2 per cent in 1940.
Meanwhile, the City's suburban area more than doubled its share of the
State's population so that, by 1940, more than sixty per cent of the
are only slightly below the ratio. Since there are thirty-six senators, twenty-eight can be
apportioned among the six counties according to population. Id. at Conn.-1; Conn. State
Register and Manual 43, 529-31, 703-07 (1962).
112. For a discussion of the limitations on the senatorial representation of New York's
most populous counties, see Silva, supra note 71, at 603-13. A similar limitation is found in
Pennsylvania's constitution, which prohibits any city or county from having more than
one sixth of the total number of senators. Pa. Const. art. II, § 16; see also Corter, Penn-
sylvania Ponders Apportionment, 32 Temp. L.Q. 279, 289 & nn.24-26 (1959); Report of
the [Pennsylvania] Commission on Constitutional Revision 21 (1959). Since Philadelphia
County's population is declining both relatively and absolutely so that it now has only
17.7% of the Commonwealth's total population, this provision is only a slight limitation on
Philadelphia's senatorial representation. Pa. Dep't of Internal Affairs, Re-Apportionment in
Pennsylvania 23 (1961). The simplest form of such a limitation is found in California, where
no county may have more than one senator and not more than three counties may be
combined into a senatorial district. Consequently, the 14,294 inhabitants of Alpine, Inyo and
Mono counties collectively have the same senatorial representation that Los Angeles County's
6,038,771 inhabitants have. Nat'l Munic. League op. cit. supra note 111, at Cal.-I.
113. E.g., those southern and southwestern states such as Arizona, Florida, North Caro-
lina and Texas, where industrialization is drawing population from the small towns and
rural areas to the new industrial centers.
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State's citizens and voters lived in the New York City metropolitan area.
Since 1940, however, the growth upstate has been approximately the
same as the growth in the New York City metropolitan area, and the
ratio of citizen population between the New York City area, the thirteen
metropolitan area counties upstate, and the forty less urban counties
seems to have stabilized at roughly 63 : 22 15 while the ratio of
voters has stabilized at approximately 61 : 24 15. In summary, a new
stability appears to have been established not only between the upstate
counties and the New York City metropolitan area but also between the
thirteen upstate metropolitan area counties and the State's forty less urban
counties.1 4
While an equilibrium between the Upstate and the Downstate appears
to have been established, a similar kind of equilibrium has not been
established within each of the State's seven metropolitan areas. Rather,
in each of these areas, there has been an exodus from the central city
to the suburbs. In 1940, sixty-seven per cent of the State's population
lived in the ten central cities located in these seven metropolitan areas.
Today, however, only fifty-six per cent can be found in these cities.
Conversely, the seven suburban areas have jumped from 17.85 per cent in
1940 to 29.77 per cent two decades later." 5 During the past decade,
114. See Appendix G-1 infra.
115. Percentage of the State's total population in the seven metropolitan areas and In the
remainder of the State:
Area 1940 1950 1960
Ten Central Cities 67.24 64.38 55.75
Seven Suburban Areas 17.85 20.96 29.77
Remainder of State 14.91 14.66 14.48
New York State 100.00 100.00 100.00
1. Albany-Schenectady-Troy 2.14 2.02 1.66
Suburban areas 1.80 1.96 2.26
2. Binghamton 0.58 0.54 0.45
Suburban areas 0.65 0.70 0.81
3. Buffalo 4.27 3.91 3.17
Suburban areas 2.84 3.43 4.61
4. New York City 55.31 53.22 46.37
Suburban areas 9.29 11.22 17.36
5. Rochester 2.41 2.24 1.90
Suburban areas 0.84 1.05 1.60
6. Syracuse 1.53 1.49 1.29
Suburban areas 1.48 1.65 2.07
7. Rome-Utica 1.00 0.96 0.91
Suburban areas 0.95 0.95 1.06
Above statistics computed from data in Appendix F infra. See notes at end of that
appendix.
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this decline has been absolute as well as relative in nine of the State's ten
central cities.11 Consequently, as one might expect, each of the State's
seven suburban areas has jumped phenomenally with New York City's
suburbs in the lead.. 7 These generalizations are true not only for the
distribution of the State's population but also for the distribution of the
State's electorate. .8
New York City gained seven assemblymen in the half century from
1894 to 1943 but lost two in 1953 and will lose another nine at the
next reapportionment. In the past, the New York City metropolitan area
has gained assemblymen at the expense of the remainder of the State. At
the next reapportionment, however, New York City's suburban counties
will gain their additional assemblymen at the City's expense while the
rest of the State will also gain three assemblymen at the City's expense,"'
although the Upstate has no larger a proportion of the State's population
or electorate than it had in 1950.120 A similar pattern can be found in
senatorial apportionment. While New York City gained approximately
4y2 senate seats12' from 1894 to 1953, the City will lose four at the next
116. Rome is the only one of the ten cities where the decline was not absolute. 1-A
1960 Census of Population 34-29. The greatest increases came in cities having from 10,000
to 100,000 inhabitants. The larger cities and certain rural counties showed a relative and/or
absolute decline. Id. at 34-37. See Appendix F infra.
117. See Appendix F infra.
118. See Appendices G-2 and G-3 infra.
119. The State's 150 assemblymen were, are and will be distributed as follows:
Act of Act of Census Change
Area 1894 1943 1953 of 1960 1894-1960
New York City 60 67 65 56 - 4
Suburban N.Y.C. 6 13 16 22 +16
Remainder of State 84 70 69 72 -12
5 Revised Record of the Constitutional Convention of 1894 of the State of New York 744
(1900); N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 359, art. 8, § 123; N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 893, art.
8, § 123; and note 73 supra.
120. See Appendix G-1 infra.
121. In 1894, Richmond was combined with Suffolk County into one senatorial district.
Suffolk and the area now contained in New York City together had twenty-one senators.
N.Y. Const. art. II, § 3 (1894). Thus, New York City had approximately 20Y2 senators
while Suffolk had roughly 3/ senator. The City now has twenty-five senators, representing
a gain of approximately 4Y2 senators. Since metropolitan and nonmetropoIitan counties are
sometimes combined in the same senatorial district, it is difficult to classify certain districts
as either metropolitan or nonmetropolitan. One can, however, divide such a senator be-
tween the metropolitan and nonmetropolitan area according to the proportion of his con-
stituents who lived in the metropolitan area. If one uses this method, New York City's
suburban area had approximately 1.75 senators in 1894 and has approximately 7.37 today,
representing a gain of roughly 5.62 senators.
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reapportionment' although the City's present senatorial representation
is only commensurate with the City's population and electorate.12' Two
of these senatorial seats will go to the City's suburban Suffolk County,
12 4
but one will go upstate while the fourth will cease to exist.' 5
In summary, New York City is declining in population, in voters,
and in legislative representation. The City's decline in population and
voters is being matched, however, by a growth in the City's suburban
area so that the population-voter balance between the Upstate and the
Downstate is not disturbed by the City's decline. Yet, the present ap-
portionment rules will transfer three assemblymen and one senator from
the City to the Upstate so that these rules will operate not only against
the City but also against two of the City's four suburban counties.120
Thus, in the absence of a state constitutional amendment or a federal
court decree, New York State's voters "are equal but some are [becoming
increasingly] more equal than others." 27
V. APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING LITIGATION IN NEW YORK
Radio station WMCA, R. Peter Straus and others brought a voters'
and taxpayers' suit alleging that New York's legislative apportionment
122. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 893, art. 8, § 123 and note 73 supra.
123. See note 87 supra and Appendices D-1 and D-2 infra.
124. Suffolk County now has one senator, Nassau and Westchester each have three,
and Rockland is combined with Orange into a single senatorial district. N.Y. Sess. Laws
1953, ch. 893, art. 8, § 123. According to the citizen census of 1960, Suffolk has almost three
"second ratios" and, therefore, will be apportioned three senators. Since Rockland has only
slightly more than one half of a second ratio, Rockland will doubtless be combined with
another county into a single senatorial district. Although Nassau has 3.93 "first ratios" while
Westchester has 3.61 "second ratios," each of these two counties is prevented from receiv-
ing a fourth senator by the rule which states that "no county shall have four or more
senators unless it shall have a full [first] ratio for each senator." N.Y. Const. art. III, § 4
(1894). See notes 73-74 & 106 supra.
125. The constitution provides that "the senate shall always be composed of fifty mem-
bers, except that if any county having three or more senators at the time of any apportion-
ment shall be entitled on such [first] ratio to an additional senator or senators, such addi-
tional senator or senators shall be given to such county in addition to the fifty senators,
and the whole number of senators shall be increased to that extent." N.Y. Const. art. III,
§ 4 (1894). The Fay interpretation of this provision yielded a Senate of 58 members In
1953 and will yield a Senate of 57 at the next reapportionment. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 213,
52 N.E.2d 97, 101-02 (1943).
126. I.e., Nassau and Westchester. See note 124 supra. In a number of other states, the
Republican suburbs also have the greatest stake in reapportionment and redistricting on a
strict population basis. Friedman, Reapportionment Myth: Growth of Suburban Areas, 49
Nat'l Civic Rev. 184-88 (1960); The Politics of Reapportionment 6-7, 18-20, 22-23, 26;
(Jewell ed. 1962) ; id. at 66-68, 79 (Colo.), 113-16 (Ky.), 139 (Ill.), 150, 153-54, 167 (Pa.),
267 (Mich.), 298, 303, 304, 309, 310 (Md.), 317-18 (Tenn.).
127. The Seventh but Only Commandment, Onvell, Animal Farm 21, 112 (1946). See
notes 6 & 87 supra and Appendix E infra.
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deprives them-as residents of allegedly under-represented New York
City'28 -of equal protection of the laws contrary to the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution. A three-judge court was con-
vened'29 but dismissed the complaint both for lack of a federal question
and for want of equity in the relief sought. 3 ' The United States Supreme
Court subsequently decided the Tennessee case,"3' vacated the district
court's judgment in the New York case, and remanded the latter case
for reconsideration in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in the
Tennessee case. 132 During the trial in the district court, New York
City's Comptroller Abraham Beame and a New York City taxpayer
(R. Peter Straus) offered to show proof of the state legislature's dis-
crimination against the City in fiscal matters. The court refused, how-
ever, to admit this evidence on the ground that the alleged fiscal
discrimination had not been shown to result from the apportionment of
the legislature.1 33 The court dismissed the case on the ground that
"the plaintiffs have not shown by a fair preponderance of relevant evi-
dence that 'invidious discrimination' exists" in the apportionment of
the legislature." The plaintiffs filed a jurisdictional statement in the
United States Supreme Court, and the Court has agreed to hear the
case.
35
128. Silva, Making the Votes Count, 52 Nat'l Civic Rev. 489 (Oct. 1963); Appendices
I and J infra.
129. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 196 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
130. XVMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.NT.Y. 1962).
131. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
132. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 U.S. 190 (1962).
133. New York Times, Aug. 2, 1962, p. 1, col. 4. But cf. such fiscal discrimination pre-
sented in the Brief for Appellants, p. 13, Baker v. Carr, 365 U.S. 838, 864, 875 (1961),
quoted in The Politics of Reapportionment 316-17 (Jewell ed. 1962); and judicial notice
of state tax collections in various counties in the Delaware apportionment case, Sincock v.
Duffy, 215 F. Supp. 169, 182 (D. Del. 1963).
134. W7vMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See also Comment,
Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders: The Desegregation Decisions Plus a
Problem of Proof, 72 Yale L.J. 1041-61 (1963).
135. WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 374 U.S. 802 (1963) (probable jurisdiction noted).
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APPE_,ix A
CITIZEN PERCENTAGE Or ToTAL POPULATION
1892 1905 1915 1925 1930
New York State
New York City
Bronxa
Kingsb
New Yorka,c
Queensba
Richmond
Remainder of State
Albany
Allegany
Broome
Cattaraugus
Cayuga
Chautuaqua
Chemung
Chenango
Clinton
Columbia
Cortland
Delaware
Dutchess
Erie
Essexe
Franklin
Fulton & Hamilton
Genesee
Greene
Herkimer
Jefferson
Lewis
Livingston!
Madison
Monroe
Xontgomery
Nassaud
Niagara
Oneida
87.6 83.2
80.4 76.1
- 80.1
86.8 80.1
75.5 68.9
90.7 88.5
91.2 86.0
94.7 90.9
95.6 92.2
97.6 98.1
96.8 91.8
95.8 92.6
96.5 93.8
94.9 91.5
98.6 96.4
98.6 97.5
96.5 95.1
96.3 92.3
98.0 95.9
98.3 96.6
95.4 92.3
92.6 88.6
96.0 95.2
91.3 92.5
96.1 92.7
95.6 90.5
97.4 96.2
94.8 87.9
92.8 92.4
97.6 95.4
95.9 92.9
98.4 95.7
94.2 88.0
93.4 85.3
88.6 85.2
91.2 84.6
94.3 86.5
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86.6 88.1
80.9 83.7
83.4 84.2
81.6 84.3
74.9 78.9
90.4 89.4
88.7 89.4
93.0 93.5
94.5 94.7
99.2 99.1
92.3 94.3
97.1 97.4
94.6 95.4
94.1 94.7
97.4 97.8
98.4 98A
95.6 96.0
95.2 95.3
97.2 97.4
97.8 98.2
94.2 93.4
91.9 92.7
97.6 96.8
95.3 94.8
95.1 95.6
93.0 94.4
96.7 97.1
92.1 93.7
93.9 94.9
96.1 96.5
95.6 96.6
97.3 98.0
91.1 92.2
90.6 92.1
89.1 90.0
97.1 88.5
90.8 92.9
1940 1950
92.0 95.8
89.0 94.3
89.0 95.0
89.2 94.8
85.5 91.6
92.8 95.7
94.0 96.6
95.8 97.5
96.3 97.8
99.4 99.3
96.9 98.3
97.8 98.8
96.5 98.4
96.2 98.5
98.3 99.0
98.5 99.0
97.4 97.8
96.5 97.5
99.1 99.0
98.3 98.7
94.8 96.5
95.8 97.7
98.0 98.4
96.8 98.0
97.1 98.3
96.4 98.1
97.0 97.7
95.4 97.2
96.7 97.7
97.6 98.5
97.6 98.6
98A 98.7
95.3 97.4
94.6 96.7
94.2 97.5
93.0 96.9
95.4 97.1
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A Pn,'Dx A (Cont'd)
Area 1892 1905 1915 1925 1930 1940 1950 1960
Onondaga
Ontariof
Orange
Orleans
Oswego
Otsego
Putnam
Rennselaer
Rockland
St. Lawrence
Saratoga
Schenectady
Schoharie
Schuyler
Seneca
Steuben
Suffolk
Sullivan
Tioga
Tompkins
Ulster
Warren
Washington
Wayne
Westchesterc
94.2 95.1
96.4 96.2
95.4 93.9
93.4 96.0
97.3 98.2
99.0 98.9
93.6 92.3
94.4 96.8
92.9 91.6
93.5 94.2
95.8 96.6
92.5 90.9
99.5 98.6
96.8 98.7
97.7 97.8
98.7 98.6
92.6 92.6
98.7 96.5
99.0 98.8
98.7 97.7
97.4 96.1
98.4 97.4
97.2 96.2
96.4 96.8
89.1 88.5
90.9 92.6
95.0 96.6
91.6 94.8
92.4 95.5
93.8 96.1
97.3 97.8
91.9 94.4
95.3 95.8
90.3 94.2
92.1 92.2
93.3 94.9
87.5 91.3
97.5 97.9
97.0 98.0
94.6 95.0
97.2 98.1
88.4 89.9
91.8 90.7
98.2 97.6
95.5 96.1
93.7 95.2
96.1 97.7
95.3 97.0
93.7 96.3
84.9 88.9
93.5 95.9
96.9 97.8
95.3 96.4
95.9 96.9
96.6 97.6
97.9 98.0
93.6 96.6
95.8 97.1
94.5 95.0
92.5 95.3
94.9 96.8
92.6 95.4
98.5 97.6
98.2 98.8
94.9 96.0
98.3 98.7
90.6 92.7
94.0 94.7
97.8 98.0
96.6 97.3
96.3 96.6
97.6 98.3
97.0 97.9
97.2 98.0
88.9 93.6
97.9 980
98.5 99.0
97.5 97.9
98.2 99.1
98.4 99.1
98.7 99-3
96.9 97.7
98.0 98.8
96.5 96.4
97.6 98.1
98.1 98.9
97.8 98.6
97.9 99.1
99.2 99.5
96.6 97.7
99.3 99.5
94.5 97.5
96.6 98.1
98.9 99.5
97.9 97.1
97.5 98.3
98.7 99.1
98.3 99.3
98.8 99.1
96.1 96.7
Wyoming 96.9 98.2 95.5 96.9 97.0 97.7 98.3 99-3
Yates 97.7 98.3 96.9 98.3 98.4 98.6 99.1 99.7
a Part of New York taken from Bronx, 1914.
b Parts of Queens annexed to Kings, 1915 and 1925. Part of Kings annexed to Queens,
1925.
e Part of Westchester annexed to New York, 1895.
a Part of Queens taken to form Nassau, 1899. Part of Queens annexed to Nassau, 1928.
e Part of Essex annexed to Hamilton, 1915.
f Part of Ontario annexed to Livingston, 1922.
All statistics used and, consequently, all computations are for the county as it was
constituted at the time of the census. Computed from data published in the following
sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 171-214 (1895); N.Y. Leg. Manual 860-61 (1935); N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 85, p. 57 (1935); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 59, pp. 32-33, 36-37 (1942); N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 98, p. 14 (1953). Data on the 1960 census supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census.
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APPENDIX B
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION
Area
New York State
New York City
Bronx
Kings
New York
Queens
Richmond
Remainder of State
Albany
Allegany
Broome
Cattaraugus
Cayuga
Chautauqua
Chemung
Chenango
Clinton
Columbia
Cortland
Delaware
Dutchess
Erie
E sex
Franklin
Fulton & Hamilton
Genesee
Greene
Herkimer
Jefferson
Lewis
Livingston
Madison
Number of popular votes
cast for assemblyman
per hundred inhabitants
1958 1960 1962
32.8 41.9 32.8
28.9 38.9 29,3
30.3 38.5 29.7
27.1 36.1 27.1
27.5 35.7 26.7
31.7 46.2 34.2
29.9 39.3 32.9
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1960 total
population
16,782,304
7,781,984
1,424,815
2,627,319
1,698,281
1,809,578
221,991
9,000,320
272,926
43,978
212,661
80,187
73,942
145,377
98,706
43,243
72,722
47,322
41,113
43,540
176,008
1,064,688
35,300
44,742
55,571
53,994
31,372
66,370
87,835
23,249
44,053
54,635
1963]
Area
Monroe
Montgomery
Nassau
Niagara
Oneida
Onondaga
Ontario
Orange
Orleans
Oswego
Otsego
Putnam
Rensselaer
Rockland
St. Lawrence
Saratoga
Schenectady
Schoharie
Schuyler
Seneca
Steuben
Suffolk
Sullivan
Tioga
Tompkins
Ul9ter
Warren
Washington
Wayne
Westchester
Wyoming
Yates
Based on data ]
1079-80, 1180-81
Secretary of State.
1960 total
population
586,387
57,240
1,300,171
242,269
264,401
423,028
68,070
183,734
34,159
86,118
51,942
31,722
142,585
136,803
111,239
89,096
152,896
22,616
15,044
31,984
97,691
666,784
45,272
37,802
66,164
118,804
44,002
48,476
67,989
808,891
34,793
18,614
Number of popular votes
cast for assemblyman
per hundred inhabitants
1958 1960 1962
published in N.Y. Leg. Manual 1104-22 (1959); N.Y. Leg. Manual
(1962-1963); and 1962 election data supplied by the New York
APPORTIONMENT
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APPENDix C
REGISTRANTS AND VOTERS
Number of popular votes cast for
assemblyman per hundred registrants
Area 1958 1960 1962
New York State 81.5 85.4 69.8
New York City
Bronx
Kings
New York
Queens
Richmond
Remainder of State
Albany
Allegany
Broome
Cattaraugus
Cayuga
Chautauqua
Chemung
Chenango
Clinton
Columbia
Cortland
Delaware
Dutchess
Erie
Essex
Franklin
Fulton & Hamilton
Genesee
Greene
Herkimer
Jefferson
Lewis
Livingston
Madison
Monroe
Montgomery
Nassau
Niagara
Oneida
84.4*
85.6*
84.9*
81.3*
85.0*
89.3*
79.5
89.8
70.5
81.8*
68.2
82.4
77.4
83.4*
73.9
73.8
71.4
74.0
68.2#
71.0
77.2*
68.2
70.4
76.2
73.9
72.4
75.7
69.9
69.4#
71.6
67.8
86.9*
80.8
77.3*
81.3
81.4
86.2*
88.0*
82.1*
84.0*
91.2*
91.5*
84.9
92.9
82.8
91.1*
78.0
87.6
86.9
89.4*
65.8
82.4
81.7
82.9
95.6#
79.0
79.7*
76.5
78.1
84.2
83.9
78.4
84.3
81.8
82.3#
83.1
79.0
91.9*
86.8
85.1*
86.7
88.7
66.3*
67.6*
65.5*
63.1*
68.1*
73.0*
72.6
87.4
64.2
78.6*
66.0
81.1
74.0
76.7*
72.5
66.0
72.2
71.3
67.7
68.6
64.6*
60,8
42.2
75.7
71.5
72.5
72.2
66.4
47.0#
72.2
63.9
83.5*
79.5
71.2*
78.4
77.5
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APP mix C (Cont'd)
Number of popular votes cast for
assemblyman per hundred registrants
Area 1958 1960 1962
Onondaga
Ontario
Orange
Orleans
Oswego
Otsego
Putnam
Rensselaer
Rockland
St. Lawrence
Saratoga
Schenectady
Schoharie
Schuyler
Seneca
Steuben
Suffolk
Sullivan
Tioga
Tompkins
Ulster
Warren
Washington
Wayne
Westchester
Wyoming
Yates
90.3*
74.9
72.0
70.7
74-5
71.1
79.6*
86.7
72.0
63.0
73.6
84.1*
74.8#
68.4#
76.0
72.7
89.3*
68.5#
69.1
90.1*
70.0
76.1
69.7
70.2
86.7*
70.9#
74.2
88.7*
83.3
81.8
80.7
83.9
80.7
87.3*
91.7
82.4
76.3
81.0
91.3*
80.4#
80.5#
82.6
60.4
86.4*
51.8#
81.4
72.3*
77.5
83.8
80.3
81.3
90.5*
82.0#
82.0
73.0*
70.0
71.3
52.9
69.0
68.5
68.5*
83.2
73.7
62.1
69.4
83.9*
70.9 #
66.2#
74.9
69.5
69.74
48.4
65.3
76.0*
70.1
69.4
69.9
65.9
79.2*
64.30
68.3
* Personal permanent registration as permitted by enabling legislation. N.Y. Sess. Laws
1954, ch. 531, §§ 350-52. Although the number of votes cast for assemblyman was larger
in 1962 (5,511,816) than in 1958 (5,506,531), the number of voters per hundred registrants
dropped sharply in many of the more populous counties because there were over a million
more registrants in 1962 (7,892,002) than in 1958 (6,759,343) largely as a result of the
adoption of "permanent" registration in these counties.
# Nonpersonal registration in all parts of the county. N.Y. Election Law § 157.
All other counties have nonpersonal registration outside of cities and villages of five
thousand inhabitants or more (ibid.) but personal registration in all other parts of the
county. N.Y. Election Law §§ 153-54, 156, 162, 166.
Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 1044-45,
1104-22 (1959); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1069-70, 1124-25 (1961-1962); and data on 1962
registration and elections supplied by N.Y. Secretary of State.
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CITZENS, LEGISLATORS, AND VOTERS
Nine other
most Forty-seven
New York populous other New York
Percentage of: City a  countiesb countieso  State
Citizen population in 1960 45.7 33.8 20.5 100.0%
Senators based on
1960 citizen populationd 3 6.8d 35.1 28.1 100.0
Assemblymen based on
1960 citizen populatione 37.3 29.3 33.3 99.9
Vote for governor (1962) 41.9 36.9 21.2 100.0
Vote for state senator (1962) 41.4 37.4 21.2 100.0
Vote for assemblyman (1962) 41.4 37.2 21.4 100.0
Vote for state senator (1960) 42.4 36.3 21.3 100.0
Vote for assemblyman (1960) 43.1 35.8 21.1 100.0
Vote for governor (1958) 41.3 36.7 22.0 100.0
Vote for state senator (1958) 40.8 37.1 22.1 100.0
Vote for assemblyman (1958) 40.8 36.9 22.3 100.0
a Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond.
b All counties outside New York City having two or more assembly ratios of citizen
population: Albany, Erie, Monroe, Nassau, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Suffolk, and
Westchester.
c AlU counties having less than two assembly ratios of citizen population.
d Apportioned in conformity with In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943). One
senator apportioned to Richmond on less than a full ratio.
0 Apportioned according to the Brown formula. In re Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E.
545 (1916); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, pp. 11-12 (1953).
Computed from data on 1960 citizen population supplied by U.S. Bureau of the Census;
data on 1962 election supplied by N.Y. Secretary of State; N.Y. Leg. Manual 1168-99
(1962-1963); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1060-61, 1093-1122 (1959). Based on whole vote for
governor but only valid votes for senator and assemblyman.
1963] APPORTIONMENT
APPENDLx D-2
Crfizums, LFaisLATORS, AND Vo.RSs
Eight other
most Forty-eight
New York populous other New York
Percentage of: Citya  countiesb countieso State
Citizen population in 1950 52.4 25.7 21.9 100.0% o
Senators, Act of 19 53d 43.1c 27.6 29.3 100.0
Assemblymen, Act of 19 53 d 43.3 22.7 34.0 100.0
Vote for state senator (1952) 48.0 30.1 21.9 100.0
Vote for assemblyman (1952) 47.7 29.8 22.5 100.0
Vote for governor (1950) 49.4 28.1 22.5 100.0
Vote for state senator (1950) 47.3 29.4 23.3 100.0
Vote for assemblyman (1950) 47.7 28.9 23.4 100.0
a Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond.
b All counties outside New York City having two or more assembly ratios of Citizen
population: Albany, Erie, Monroe, Nassau, Oneida, Onondaga, Suffolk, and Westchester.
c All counties having less than two assembly ratios of citizen population.
d N.Y. Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 893, §§ 120-25.
c One senator apportioned to Richmond on less than a full ratio. Silva, Apportionment
in New York (Part Two: Apportionment of the -New York Senate), 30 Fordham L. Rev.
581, 604-08, 628-32 (1962). 9
Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98,
pp. 14-15 (1953); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1259-88 (1953); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1192-93, 1213-42
(1951). Based on whole vote for governor but only valid votes for senator and assem-
blyman.
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CmTZErNS, LEGISLATORS, AND VOTERS
Eight other
most Forty-eight
New York populous other New York
Percentage of: City a  counties b  countieso Stato
Citizen population in 1940 53.5 24.0 22.5 100.0%
Senators, Act of 19 4 3 d 44.6e 25.0 30.4 100.0
Assemblymen, Act of 194 3d 44.7 21.3 34.0 100.0
Vote for governor (1942) 47.8 27.8 24.4 100.0
Vote for state senator (1942) 47.9 27.8 243 100.0
Vote for assemblyman (1942) 47.9 27.8 24.3 100.0
Vote for state senator (1940) 51.7 25.4 22.9 100.0
Vote for assemblyman (1940) 51.6 25.5 22.9 100.0
a Bronx, Kings, New York, Queens, and Richmond.
b All counties outside New York- City having two or more assembly ratios of citizen
population: Albany, Erie, Monroe, Nassau, Oneida, Onondaga, Suffolk, and Westchester.
c All counties having less than two assembly ratios of citizen population.
d N.Y. Sess. Laws 1943, ch. 359, §§ 120-24.
6 One senator apportioned to Richmond on less than a full ratio. Silva, Apportionment
in New York (Part Two: Apportionment of the New York Senate), 30 Fordham L. Rcv.
581, 604-08, 628-32 (1962).
Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57,
pp. 15-17, 20-21, 48-49 (1942); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1170-71, 1193-1237 (1943); N.Y. Leg.
Manual 1184-1232 (1941). Based on whole vote in all cases.
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ApmP.Dx E
VoTER INEQUAlIT N n ASSEMBLY Enr.crioNs
umber of NRelative weight
assemblymen under Number of popular votes per assemblymanb of one vote for
Area census of 1960G 1958 1960 1962 Average assemblymano
Albany 2 68,859 75,478 66,980 70,439 1.00
Westchester 6 53,012 64,070 52,213 56,432 1.248
Queens 13 44,087 64,243 47,674 52,001 1.355
Oneida 2 47,410 60,061 46,240 51,237 1.375
Monroe 5 45,711 56,223 48,042 49,992 IA09
Nassau 10 45,846 57,142 46,741 49,910 IAI
Erie 8 45,112 56,931 44,350 48,798 1.443
Bronx 10 43,217 54,891 42,361 46,823 1.504
Suffolk 5 39,291 53,554 45,187 46,011 1531
New York 12 38,930 50,563 37,837 42,443 1.660
Onondaga 4 41,250 48,052 37,858 42,387 1.662
Kings 19 37,426 49,908 37,470 41,601 1.693
Niagara 2 35,478 48,047 35,221 39,582 1.780
Richmond 2 33,133 43,605 36,553 37,764 1.865
Schuyler 1 6,095 7,246 5,720 6,354 11.086
All other
counties 49 24,892 30,151 23,953 26,332 2.675
Entire State 150 36,710 46,870 36,745 40,108 1.756
a See note 73 supra.
b The total number of popular votes cast for assembly candidates in that area divided
by that area's number of assemblymen under the apportionment based on the citizen
census of 1960. Computed from data in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 1104-22
(1959); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1180-99 (1962-1963); and data on the 1962 assembly elections
supplied by the N.Y. Secretary of State.
0 The average number of popular votes per assemblyman in Albany County (70,439)
divided by the average number of popular votes per assemblyman in any other given
area. The quotient means, for example, that one popular vote cast for assemblyman
in Schuyler County had 11.086 times the weight of one cast in Albany County. To put
it another way, one voter in Schuyler County had more weight than eleven in Albany
County. See also note 87 supra.
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POPULATION:
SEVEN "STANDARD METROPOLITAN AREAS"a AND REmAINDER OF STATE
Area 1940
Ten Central Cities 9,063,309
Seven Suburban Areasb 2,406,467
Remainder of StateO 2,009,366
New York State 13,479,142
1. Albany-Schenectady-Troy 288,430
Suburban arease 242,819
2. Binghamton 78,309
Suburban areasO 87,440
3. Buffalo 575,901
Suburban areasf 382,586
4. New York City 7,454,995
Bronx 1,394,711
Kings 2,698,285
New York 1,889,924
Queens 1,297,634
Richmond 174,441
Suburban areasg 1,251,922
5. Rochester 324,975
Suburban areash  113,255
6. Syracuse 205,967
Suburban areasi  200,014
7. Rome-Utica 134,732
Suburban areasi 128,431
a The seven standard metropolitan areas a.,
Census. 1-A 1960 Census of Population xxiii-xxv.
b The areas listed in notes d-j infra.
1950
9,548,138
3,108,100
2,173,954
14,830,192 1(
299,091
290,268
80,674
104,024
580,132
509,098
7,891,957
1,451,277
2,738,175
1,960,101
1,550,849
191,555
1,663,986
332,488
155,144
220,583
244,531
143,213
141,049
now defined
1960
9,356,289
4,996,404
2,429,611
6,782,304
278,900
378,603
75,941
136,720
532,759
774,198
7,781,984
1,424,815
2,627,319
1,698,281
1,809,578
221,991
2,912,649
318,611
Per cent increase
1940-50 1950-60
5.35 - 2.01
29.16 60.75
8.19 11.76
10.02 13.16
3.70 - 6.75
19.54 30A3
3.02 - 5.87
18.97 31A3
0.73 - 8.17
33.07 52.07
5.86 - 1.39
4.06 - 1.82
1.48 - 4.05
3.71 -13.36
19.51 16.68
9.81 15.89
32.91 74.73
2.31 - 4.17
267,776 36.99 72.60
216,038 7.10 - 2.06
347,743 22.26 42.21
152,056 6.29 6.17
178,715 9.82 26.70
by the U.S. Bureau of the
0 The 40 counties outside New York City and not listed in notes d-j infra.
d All of Saratoga County and the remainder of Albany, Rensselaer, and Schenectady
counties.
e Remainder of Broome County.
f All of Niagara County and the remainder of Erie County.
o Nassau, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester counties.
h Remainder of Monroe County.
All of Madison and Oswego counties and the remainder of Onondaga County.
j All of Herkimer County and the remainder of Oneida County.
Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 960-61,
1015-16 (1958); 1-A 1960 Census of Population 34-39.
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APPmm DIx G-1
DsmuTriox oF Naw YoPx's Bony PoLiTic
Percentage of citizen population
Area 1892 1940 1950 1960
New York City 42.54 53.48 52.37 45.69
New York City suburban area0  3.80 9.46 11.30 17.49
Erie County 5.26 6.17 6.19 6A0
12 other metropolitan area
counties upstateb 18.69 15.17 15.13 15.66
40 remaining counties 29.71 15.72 15.01 14.76
New York State 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Percentage of presidential vote
Area 1892 1940 1948 1960
New York City 37.42 51.22 51.01 42.60
New York City suburban area0  3.92 10.22 11.30 18.11
Erie County 5.12 5.94 6.22 6.69
12 other metropolitan area
counties upstateb 20.20 16.55 16.55 17.17
40 remaining counties 33.34 16.07 14.92 15.43
New York State 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Percentage of gubernatorial vote
Area 1894 1942 1950 1962
New York City 37.92 47.82 49.43 41.91
New York City suburban area o  3.79 10.33 11.95 19.06
Erie County 5.46 6.31 6.18 6.56
12 other metropolitan area
counties upstateb 20.32 18.70 17.16 17.52
40 remaining counties 32.51 16.84 15.28 14.95
New York State 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
a Nassau, Rockland, Suffolk, and Westchester counties.
b Albany, Broome, Herkimer, Madison, Monroe, Nriagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Oswego,
Rensselaer, Saratoga, and Schenectady are included along with Erie in the six standard
metropolitan areas upstate by the U.S. Bureau of the Census.
See notes at the end of Appendix F supra.
Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 57 pp. 50-51
(1942); N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 98, p. 15 (1953); and data on 1960 citizen population
supplied by the U.S. Bureau of the Census; Burnham, Presidential Ballots 1836-1892,
at 632-47 (1955); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1156-57 (1942); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1186-87, 1192-93
(1951); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1128-29 (1962-1963); N.Y. Leg. Manual 966-67 (1895);
N.Y. Leg. Manual 1211-12 (1944); and data on the 1962 gubernatorial election supplied
by the N.Y. Secretary of State. Based on whole vote in all cases except for the presi-
dential elections of 1940 and 1948 when the blank, void and scattered ballots were
excluded from the county and city counts.
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APPENDIX G-2
PERCENTAGE OF PRESIDENTIAL VOTE: SEVEN "STANDARD METROPOLITAN AREAs"
AND REmAiNDER OF STATE
Area 1940 1948 1956 1960
Ten Central Cities 64.21 63.52 55.55 52.80
Seven Suburban Areas 19.72 21.55 29.20 31.77
Remainder of State 16.07 14.93 15.25 15A3
New York State 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1. Albany-Schenectady-Troy 2.69 2.70 2.25 2.07
Suburban areas 2.25 2.38 2.66 2.72
2. Binghamton 0.57 0.50 0A8 0.47
Suburban areas 0.64 0.65 0.79 0.83
3. Buffalo 4.23 4.11 3.42 3.28
Suburban areas 2.82 3.29 4.34 4.80
4. New York City 51.22 51.01 44.82 42.60
Suburban areas 10.22 11.30 16.56 18.11
5. Rochester 2.71 2.52 2.22 2.07
Suburban areas 1.04 1.17 1.66 1.89
6. Syracuse 1.75 1.66 1.42 1.37
Suburban areas 1.69 1.73 2.08 2.22
7. Rome-Utica 1.04 1.02 0.94 0.94
Suburban areas 1.06 1.03 1.11 1.20
For the U.S. Census Bureau's definition of each of the above areas, see notes at end of
Appendix F supra. Based on whole vote for 1956 and 1960 but blank, void, and scattered
ballots excluded for 1940 and 1948 since the data published on the 1940 and 1948
presidential elections did not report blank, void and scattered ballots either for counties
or for cities.
Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 1156-59
(1942); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1186-89 (1951); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1054-57 (1959); N.Y.
Leg. Manual 1128-31 (1962-1963).
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Asa iFND.x G-3
PERCENTAGE OF GuBERNATORIAL VoTE: SEVEN "STA-'NDAM METRoPoLrTr, ARES"
AND RtmANDER OF STATE
Area 1942 1950 1958 1962
Ten Central Cities 62.20 61.78 52.33 51.95
Seven Suburban Areas 20.96 22.94 31.99 33.10
Remainder of State 16.84 15.28 15.68 14.95
New York State 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1. Albany-Schenectady-Troy 3.41 2.81 2.44 2.20
Suburban areas 2.85 2.68 2.90 2.96
2. Binghamton 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.45
Suburban areas 0.60 0.70 0.81 0.86
3. Buffalo 4.42 3.95 3.40 3.15
Suburban areas 2.96 3.38 4.S6 4.67
4. New York City 47.82 49.43 41.29 41.91
Suburban areas 10-33 11.95 18.36 19.06
5. Rochester 2.92 2.47 2.20 2.05
Suburban areas 1.26 1.33 1.90 2.14
6. Syracuse 2.00 1-57 1.55 1.31
Suburban areas 1.86 1.81 2.29 2.23
7. Rome-Utica 1.10 1.04 0.97 0.88
Suburbanareas 1.10 1.09 1.17 1.18
For the U.S. Census Bureau's definition of each of the above areas, see notes at end
of Appendix F supra. Based on whole vote-i.e., blank, void and scattered ballots
included.
Computed from data published in the following sources: N.Y. Leg. Manual 1211-12,
1299-1458 (1944); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1192-95 (1951); N.Y. Leg. Manual 1060-63 (1959);
and data on the 1962 gubernatorial election supplied by the N.Y. Secretary of State.
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APPENDix H
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE Or LEGISLATIVE APPORTIONMENTS AND DIsTRICTINGs
IN NEW YORK STATE: 1777-DATE
1777 Constitutional Convention.
1791 Chapter 4.
1796 Chapter 19.
1801 Chapter 125.
1802 Chapter 81.
1808 Chapter 90.
1815 Chapters 142, 160, 208.
1821 Constitutional Convention apportioned Senate only.
1822 Chapter 207, Assembly only.
1826 Chapter 289.
1836 Chapter 436.
1846 Chapters 44, 328.
Constitutional Convention apportioned Senate only.
1857 Chapters 337, 339.
1866 Chapters 607, 805.
1879 Chapter 208.
Became law without governor's signature.
1892 Chapter 397.
Held constitutional. People ex rel. Carter v. Rice, 135 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 921 (1892).
1894 Constitutional Convention.
1906 Chapter 431.
Held unconstitutional. In re Sherill, 188 N.Y. 185, 81 N.E. 124 (1907).
1907 Chapter 727.
1909 Chapter 59, Art. VIII, §§ 120-22.
1916 Chapter 373.
Held unconstitutional. In re Dowling, 219 N.Y. 44, 113 N.E. 545 (1916).
1917 Chapter 798.
1943 Chapter 359, amended by Laws of 1944, chs. 530, 725, 733.
Held constitutional. In re Fay, 291 N.Y. 198, 52 N.E.2d 97 (1943).
1953 Chapter 893, amended by Laws of 1954, chs. 2, 821.
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APPENDLX I
1954 SENATE DisRucms wiTH 1960 CrrzEN POPULTION
* 1st 650,112 * 31st 281,879
* 2nd 320,100 * 32nd 265,439
* 3rd 527,946 33rd 311,707
* 4th 427,755 34th 235,420
# 5th 246,260 35th 249,135
# 6th 498,624 36th 269,098
# 7th 322,793 37th 189,068
# 8th 375,353 38th 173,098
# 9th 290,051 39th 166,715
#10th 277,853 40th 224,386
#11th 274,272 41st 176,572
#12th 287,779 42nd 259,330
#13th 263,057 43rd 195,026
#14th 263,283 44th 223,150
#15th 271,571 45th 191,620
#16th 324,809 46th 189,514
# 17th 280,299 47th 209,597
#18th 275,587 48th 175,077
#19th 216,764 49th 195,067
#20th 261,259 50th 199,515
#21st 259,276 51st 284,927
#22nd 256,774 52nd 286,102
#23rd 270,506 53rd 209,244
#24th 274,934 54th 235,677
#25th 261,320 55th 327,030
#26th 319,999 56th 316,163
#27th 320,417 57th 396,455
#28th 335,239 58th 223,380
#29th 392,552
*30th 234,861 Total 16,240,786
Tabulated from data supplied by the Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment.
* Suburban New York City. Rockland County is combined with Orange County in the
33rd District.
# New York City.
Average = 16,240,786 divided by 58 280,014
Citizen population of most populous district (Ist in Suffolk) 650,112
Deviation from average (650,112) divided by 280,014) 232.177
Citizen population of least populous district (39th District) 166,715
Deviation from average (166,715 divided by 280,014) 59-545o
Ratio of most populous to least populous (650,112 divided by 166,715) 3.9 to 1
Citizen population of 30 least populous districts = 6,717,972 (41-365o).
Citizen population of 28 most populous districts = 9,522,814 (58.64o).
See Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment, 72 Yale L.J. 90, 102-04 (1962).
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APPENDIX J
1954 ASSMBLY DISTRICTS WITH 1960 CIzEN POPULATIoN
New York City
Bronx, 1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
llth
12th
Kings, 1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
17th
18th
19th
20th
118,445
100,343
101,211
106,848
113,227
100,342
108,892
107,768
118,579
124,867
139,606
128,079
111,789
143,094
133,025
140,479
108,358
86,155
83,972
130,032
86,053
90,391
86,057
93,258
186,274
135,108
138,535
142,496
97,726
89,933
129,075
85,412
21st
22nd
New York, 1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
14th
15th
16th
Queens, Ist
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
9th
10th
11th
12th
13th
Richmond, 1st
2nd
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137,205
84,083
87,403
91,374
114,643
93,638
146,677
89,922
86,378
85,188
88,668
90,261
88,962
130,735
83,936
77,768
139,771
88,745
145,519
144,532
95,786
96,375
119,537
159,441
130,722
139,126
107,134
156,428
152,127
190,069
96,285
102,343
114,421
APPORTIONMENT
1954 A
Suburban New York C
Nassau, 1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
Suffolk, 1st
2nd
3rd
W'chester, 1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
Rockland
Remainder of the State
Albany, 1st
2nd
Allegany
Broome, 1st
2nd
Cattaraugus
Cayuga
Chautauqua
Chemung
Chenango
APPENDix J (Cont'd)
SzSELY Dsrmcrs wrrH 1960 Crrizr- PoPuLATio
ity Clinton
218,061 Columbia
201,112 Cortland
213,225 Delaware
Dutchess
0I%,1zi
226,643
102,039
171,492
215,602
263,018
116,783
148,656
115,830
119,031
134,170
147,709
131,834
134,146
134,942
43,759
103,048
106,549
79,548
73,240
143,832
97,891
42,979
Erie, Ist
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7th
8th
Essex
Franklin
Fulton & Hamilton
Genesee
Greene
Herkimer
Jefferson
Lewis
Livingston
Madison
Monroe, Ist
2nd
3rd
4th
Montgomery
Niagara, Ist
2nd
1963]
71,389
46,734
40,685
43,237
171,395
87,479
159,857
79,694
87,554
171,984
144,179
162,938
145,963
34,987
43,915
55,067
53,416
30,931
65,218
86,606
23,064
43,690
54,262
152,109
133,993
142,773
142,154
56,287
124,684
110,993
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APPENDIX J (Cont'd)
1954 ASSENIBLY Disrmirs wirH 1960 CITIZEN POPULATION
Remainder of the State (Cont'd) Saratoga 88,134
Oneida, 1st 139,265
2nd 120,065 Schenectady 150,688
Schoharie 22,410
Onondaga, 1st 223,150 Schuyler 14,974
2nd 91,403
3rd 100,217 Seneca 31,235
Steuben 97,176
Ontario 67,410 Sullivan 44,434
Tioga 37,610
Orange, 1st 93,866 Tompkins 64,227
2nd 86,007
Ulster 116,818
Orleans 33,845 Warren 43,594
Oswego 85,356 Washington 48,135
Otsego 51,588 Wayne 67,344
Putnam 31,006 Wyoming 34,534
Rensselaer 140,933 Yates 18,552
St. Lawrence 109,082 Total ...................... 16,240,786
Source: N.Y. Joint Legislative Committee on Reapportionment (1963).
Average = 16,240,786 divided by 150 108,272
Citizen population of most populous district (Nassau, 4th) 314,721
Deviation from the average (314,721 divided by 108,272) 290.68%
Citizen population of least populous district (Schuyler) 14,974
Deviation from the average (14,974 divided by 108,272) 13.83%
Ratio of most populous to least populous (314,721 divided by 14,974) 21 to 1
Citizen population of 76 least populous districts = 5,427,744 (33.42%).
Citizen population of 74 most populous districts = 10,813,042 (66.58%').
See Goldberg, The Statistics of Malapportionment, 72 Yale L.J. 90, esp. 102-04. (1962).
